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This work addresses the insufficiency of United States Department of 
Defense joint doctrine for incorporating cyberspace operations into 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. This insufficiency is addressed through 
the use of a matrix, which aligns the cyberspace actions described in joint 
cyberspace doctrine against the COIN tenets outlined in joint COIN doctrine. 
Each intersection of cyberspace actions and COIN tenets is explored, first by 
listing the effects that the cyberspace action can produce in support of the COIN 
tenet. Each list of effects is then evaluated to determine the degree to which 
these effects are accounted for by current doctrine, whether these effects have 
been seen in actual COINs, and how significantly these effects contribute to a 
COIN campaign. To facilitate open discussion, we draw only from unclassified 
sources. We find that existing doctrine does not address many types of missions 
and operations that can produce effects in support of the COIN tenets. The 
intersections with effects that contribute most significantly to a COIN campaign, 
but are least accounted for by current doctrine, are prioritized; we then propose 
additions to current doctrine that account for the insufficient guidance. We 
conclude by addressing the limitations of this mapping and suggesting future 
research. 
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A. TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES’ NEAR FUTURE CONFLICTS 
The United States in future years will likely be engaged in few if any high-
intensity conflicts, but in many small wars and COINs (National Intelligence 
Council 2012, 59–62). Many also predict that the role of information technology 
will increase in both shaping and fighting these wars (National Intelligence 
Council 2012, 83–87). In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
rewritten its counterinsurgency manual, and has published its first doctrine on 
how to incorporate cyberspace operations into military operations in general. 
Current United States COIN doctrine does not fully integrate the wide range of 
cyberspace actions and effects that can contribute to COINs. It provides 
guidance that closely matches the intent-based division of cyberspace operations 
provided by United States cyberspace operations doctrine, but does not address 
the effects-based division which cyberspace operations doctrine also provides. 
Current United States COIN doctrine fails to provide as much guidance on 
cyberspace operations as it does for other supporting operations with respect to 
both the effects that cyberspace operations can achieve, and how these effects 
contribute to accomplishment of the COIN tenets. 
B. PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
This work examines the current state of United States military doctrine 
with regard to incorporation of cyberspace actions and effects into COIN 
campaigns. If current doctrine is sufficient, then there should be little to gain from 
adding or changing current doctrine. If current doctrine is not sufficient, then the 
opportunity exists to contribute to or modify doctrine in such a way that the 
United States is better able to incorporate cyberspace operations into future 
COIN campaigns. This work determines whether current doctrine is sufficient  
by creating and exploring a matrix that aligns the effects-based division of 
cyberspace operations described in Joint Publication (JP) 3–12(R), Cyberspace 
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Operations, with the COIN tenets described in JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency. This 
paper refers to this alignment process as a mapping, and uses this mapping to 
evaluate how well current doctrine addresses the effects that these cyberspace 
actions can contribute to accomplishment of the COIN tenets. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research uses a matrix format to illustrate how each cyberspace 
action can achieve effects that contribute to the accomplishment of each COIN 
tenet. We then examine the degree to which current doctrine sufficiently 
addresses these effects, and analyze the significance of these effects based on 
case examples from actual COINs, and how significant a contribution these 
effects have made or may have made, had they been achieved. Next, we 
categorize and prioritize the cells based on the degree to which doctrine 
sufficiently addresses these effects and the degree to which these effects 
contribute to accomplishment of the COIN tenets. Finally, we recommend 
additions to future doctrine that address the cells with the most significant or 
most easily addressed doctrinal insufficiencies. 
There are two components of this thesis that impact the manner in which 
our mapping is constructed and evaluated. First, our mapping is created around 
doctrinal terms that have only recently been codified in doctrine and are not 
uniformly interpreted or applied across the DOD. This lack of uniformity is equally 
true for any terminology used in the burgeoning field of cyberspace operations, 
and to a lesser degree in the politically relevant field of COIN. Among the many 
contested terms to choose from as the basis of this mapping, this thesis uses 
terminology drawn directly from the joint doctrine that drives both cyberspace and 
COIN operations. Second, we draw case examples from open-source 
information. The full impact of this decision is discussed in Chapter IV. Although 
there may be classified information available that would discredit or further credit 
the findings of this thesis, our second choice ensures that this thesis may be 
shared and discussed by a larger audience. 
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D. BACKGROUND 
A growing body of work has addressed this absence in doctrine of how 
cyberspace actions and effects can contribute to COINs. These works can be 
grouped in three different bodies: those that argue the United States cannot 
provide guidance on cyberspace operations’ contributions to COINs, those that 
provide guidance on cyberspace operations’ contributions to one or two COIN 
tenets, and those that provide guidance on one or two cyberspace actions’ 
contributions to COIN generally. 
1. Works that Doubt the United States’ Ability to Provide 
Guidance on Cyberspace Operations’ Contributions to COINs 
Some have claimed that the absence of guidance on applying cyberspace 
operations in a COIN is inevitable, because cyberspace actions cannot be 
conducted against modern insurgent groups. They base this claim either on the 
nature of the conflict or on the limitations of United States political or military 
leadership. 
Those who claim that this absence of guidance is inevitable and due to the 
nature of the conflict argue that “taking the offensive may itself be in doubt as 
limiting war to cyber space may make the principle of offense less obvious. The 
roles of offense and defense seem to blur within an insurgency model as they do 
within cyber space” (Liles, Rogers, Dietz, and Larson 2012, 176). These claims 
often stem from the inability to attribute cyberspace activity to specific actors, as 
Jasper does by stating, “technical properties of cyberattack vectors that prevent 
attribution allow actors to operate with near anonymity and impunity” (Jasper 
2015, 62). In this context, some have claimed that the best method of deterring 
malicious cyberspace activity at this time may be through “non-cyber, whole-of-
nation, and whole-of-government means” (Trujillo 2014, 50). 
Those who focus on internal limitations find two reasons why the United 
States cannot draft this type of doctrine. The first is that the nation’s political and 
military leadership is unable to make the transition to a COIN strategy that is 
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enabled and prosecuted through cyberspace effects because they apply the 
thinking and analogies of previous generations of warfare (Betz and Stephens 
2013, 148). Examples of this mindset include advisors like Haddick, who argues 
for pre-emptive OCO against foreign servers that threaten the United States 
because “deterrence and retaliation doesn’t seem the right model for cyber war” 
(Haddick 2010, 14). The other reason cited for this limitation is organizational; the 
retention of authority to conduct cyberspace operations at high levels of 
command creates a situation in which “the COCOM cannot plan and execute its 
own cyber effects” (Stallone 2009, 14). 
While there are arguments like these against the United States’ ability to 
construct better doctrinal guidance, there are many more works that assume it is 
possible and describe what this guidance would look like. Some authors have 
approached this issue of describing how cyberspace operations can be 
conducted in a COIN by focusing on specific cyberspace actions or specific 
COIN tenets, though the descriptive words used in these articles vary. There are 
also works that attempt to map individual or multiple cyberspace actions against 
COIN tenets, but these works only address some of the cyberspace actions or 
COIN tenets. 
2. Works that Provide Guidance on Cyberspace Operations’ 
Contribution to One or Two COIN Tenets 
The largest body of work that argues for incorporating cyberspace actions 
and effects into COINs is that which is focused on a specific tenet of COIN or 
two, and how cyberspace operations can contribute to that tenet. As with the 
body of knowledge that doubts the applicability of cyberspace effects and actions 
in a COIN, there are some works in this group focused on the nature of the 
conflict and others focused on the United States’ internal limitations. 
Temaat and Webster address the nature of the conflict by focusing on 
conducting cyberspace operations with effects which impact the information 
arena, from understanding the operational environment and sharing this 
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information with host nation (HN) and coalition partners (Webster 2010, 4-21), to 
disseminating the COIN commander’s narrative to the population (Temaat 2006, 
4). Brickley, Warren, and even Liles also address the nature of the conflict by 
focusing on how cyberspace defense can support securing the population by 
preventing cyber terrorism (Brickley 2012, 4–5, and Liles 2010, 51), and on how 
cyberspace operational preparation of the environment (OPE) can support the 
primacy of politics by disseminating HN political messaging (Warren 2011, 13). 
Stallone, Vacca, and Schraeder all address internal United States 
limitations, with a strong focus on how the authority to conduct cyberspace 
operations should be delegated to COIN commanders. Stallone argues that a 
Joint Force Cyber Component Commander should be given control of all 
cyberspace operations in a given Theater of Operations (Stallone 2009, 14–17), 
while Vacca and Schraeder argue against this arrangement either because the 
nature of the threats we face makes a monolithic defense structure unwise 
(Vacca 2011, 170–171), or because a single commander would have cultural 
limitations stemming from that commander’s branch affiliation (Schraeder 2008, 
46–47). While these authors disagree on the form that the authority to conduct 
cyberspace operations should take, they all pursue an ideal command 
relationship because they recognize the role that cyberspace operations can play 
in ensuring unity of command, unity of effort, and synchronizing lines of effort 
(LOEs) and lines of operations (LOOs). 
Other works regularly appear that address the application of cyberspace 
actions and effects to specific COIN tenets, but they often contain too few 
specifics on how cyberspace effects should be achieved, other than to say that 
they should be. Ringdahl provides a good example of this type of work as he 
recognizes that cyberspace operations can play a role in understanding the 
operational environment (OE), primacy of politics, and collecting the intelligence 
that can drive operations, though he provides little specific or even generalized 
examples of what this would look like (Ringdahl 2010, 7). Fidier takes a step in 
the direction of providing a framework for incorporating CO into COIN with his 
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mapping of cyberspace actions against the three fundamental operations of 
“Clear, Hold, and Build.” Unfortunately, he provides few examples of what this 
would look like, and uses a mapping that does not align with the tenets of COIN 
(Fidier 2015). Fidier’s approach also suffers from focusing exclusively on 
operations, ignoring the organizational benefits that cyberspace operations can 
provide. 
3. Works that Provide Guidance on One or Two Cyberspace 
Operations’ Contribution to COIN in General 
The other body of work that provides guidance on cyberspace operations’ 
contributions to a COIN do so by exploring a specific cyberspace action or two, 
and how they can contribute to a COIN. These works rarely address a specific 
COIN tenet, and often do not link the new use or form of a cyberspace action to 
effects in the COIN fight. 
The first group of works in this body is focused on specific cyberspace 
actions, but does not map these actions to specific COIN tenets. Tan writes 
about the expansion of cyberspace defense, including cyber deception, and how 
this can assist a COIN commander in isolating an insurgency by interfering with 
insurgents’ ability to access foreign support or domestic audiences (Tan 2003, 
23–24). His paper then explores the additional assistance that expanded 
cyberspace defense can provide in defending the population and friendly 
government infrastructure through obfuscation and misdirection (Tan 2003, 48–
51). Pendall, Wilkes, and Robinson write about the manner in which cyberspace 
operations contribute to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). They 
argue for a restructuring that better collects and disseminates information by 
examining operations in Afghanistan. Their work addresses the effects that this 
restructuring would achieve in expanding authorities and raising the United 
States military’s appreciation of cyberspace operations in a threat environment 
that is increasingly more connected to the Internet (Pendall, Wilkes, and 
Robinson 2013, 4–5), but do not give examples of what the new means or effects 
in a COIN would look like. Thomas addresses the manner in which cyberspace 
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IPB and OPE are conducted from an Information Operations (IO) perspective, 
but his discussion of the effects achieved are limited to conducting operations 
quicker and in a manner that better appreciates local cultures (Thomas 2006, 
26–28). 
The second group of analyses in this body is focused on specific 
cyberspace actions, and maps these actions to specific COIN tenets, but these 
works are often only focused on one or two of these mappings. A 2011 report by 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD-ATL) examines the ways in which cyberspace actions and effects 
are applied to COINs by describing the ways in which the United States does or 
should conduct cyberspace ISR in support of the tenet of understanding the OE 
(USD-ATL 2011, 40 & 52). Eidman and Greene provide a good example of 
cyberspace ISR and OPE mapping to the tenet of developing the COIN narrative 
by their exploration of the way that Syria used the Syrian Electronic Army as a 
proxy militia to aid them in agenda setting (Eidman and Greene 2014, 35–45). 
Mills explores the way that states can respond to insurgent uses of the Internet 
by creating pro-state video games and expanding cyberspace ISR and OPE to 
isolate the insurgency (which feeds into securing the population), aid host nations 
in understanding their operating environment (which feeds into primacy of 
politics), and collaborating with outside agencies (which feeds into unity of 
command and unity of effort) (Mills 2011, 159). In all of these works, there are 
good examples of how to map one or more cyberspace actions against one or 
more COIN tenet, but none of these papers addresses all cyberspace actions or 
all COIN tenets. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
The preceding review shows a clear need for a more complete effort to 
integrate cyberspace actions into COIN operations and doctrine. All prior efforts 
have either dismissed even the possibility of effective U.S. use of cyberspace 
effects for COIN purposes, or have dealt with only selected actions and COIN 
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tenets. Specifically, there are no studies or articles that address all of the 
cyberspace actions in JP 3–12(R) and all of the COIN tenets in JP 3–24. 
The work presented here is intended to address the gap in doctrinal 
thinking by first outlining the breadth of current primary cyberspace and COIN 
doctrines, demonstrating that current doctrine only provides an intent-based 
mapping of cyberspace operations to the COIN environment as a whole. Our 
analysis starts with the effects-based framework of cyberspace actions provided 
by JP 3–12(R) and cross-references these actions with the tenets of COIN 
provided by JP 3–24 to produce a comprehensive matrix of potential cyberspace 
applications in COIN operations. We then evaluate the matrix to determine where 
current doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance on the ways in which 
cyberspace operations can achieve effects that contribute to accomplishment of 
the COIN tenets. We categorize and prioritize these matrix entries, and propose 
additions to doctrine to address the insufficiencies with the highest priority. 




II. CURRENT STATE OF DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE 
A. JOINT PUBLICATIONS 
Major combat operations are conducted in the modern era by joint 
commands. When conducting planning operations within these commands, Joint 
Publications must be referenced and used as the authoritative source for 
planning. It is here that guidance for the application of cyberspace operations in 
COINs should lie, but the two controlling publications that address cyberspace 
operations and COINs do not provide sufficient guidance for doing so. 
1. Joint Publication 3–12(R), Cyberspace Operations 
Only one unclassified Joint Publication has been published on cyberspace 
operations, JP 3–12(R), and it does not address COINs or any other specific 
types of military campaigns. While there is a classified version of this publication, 
and there are other documents that provide guidance at this level, JP 3-12(R) is 
the primary source of unclassified guidance for the conduct of cyberspace 
operations, and is addressed as such by this thesis. The publication begins by 
outlining the DOD-wide scope and framework for incorporating cyber forces into 
the joint force. JP 3-12(R) contextualizes cyberspace operations (CO) by 
describing cyberspace using a three-layer model consisting of physical, logical, 
and cyber-persona layers (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS) 2013a, I-
2–I-4). It also provides detailed guidance on authorities, roles and 
responsibilities, legal considerations, and planning and coordination. Within this 
context, JP 3–12(R) provides guidance on how to incorporate CO into Joint 
Operations via three frameworks. 
First the publication introduces a categorization of COs based on their 
intent: Offensive CO (OCO), Defensive CO (DCO), and Department of Defense 
information network (DODIN) operations. This section of the publication includes 
examples of specific effects and mission types for DCO and DODIN operations 
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(USCJS 2013a, II-2–II-3), but these examples are neither exhaustive, nor do they 
pertain specifically to COINs. 
Second the publication introduces guidance for distinguishing cyberspace 
actions based on their desired effects. It states that while missions may be 
divided by intent, accomplishment of these missions “will require the employment 
of various capabilities to create specific effects in cyberspace” (USCJS 2013a, II-
4). The four distinguishable cyberspace actions are Cyberspace Defense, 
Cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), Cyberspace 
OPE, and Cyberspace Attack. 
Finally, the publication addresses the division of joint operations into the 
six basic groups: Command and Control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and 
maneuver, protection, and sustainment. It provides general guidance for 
incorporating cyberspace operations into these groups with “an overview of how 
each of these functions applies to effective joint operations in and through 
cyberspace” (USJCS 2013a, II-6). The bulk of this section is focused on 
authorities, integration, and deconfliction of cyberspace assets, but there is 
repeated mention of incorporating CO in a manner that achieves the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC)’s effects. The word “effect” or “effects” is used 16 times in 
these six pages, and the importance of weighing operational effects is illustrated 
well on page II-10 when the publication states that “CO capabilities, though they 
may be used in a stand-alone context, are generally most effective when 
integrated with other capabilities to create the JFC’s desired effects.” 
The absence of guidance on COINs in JP 3–12(R) is understandable, as 
the goal of the publication is not to provide guidance for incorporating cyberspace 
operations into specific campaigns like COINs. The publication acknowledges 
this fact, and accounts for it by providing general guidance on incorporating CO 
into joint operations, and categorizes COs based on either their intent or effects 
for incorporation into any campaign. 
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Two observations may be made about JP 3-12(R). First, 33 pages of the 
publication are focused on the introduction and the DOD-wide framework and 
context, while only 12 pages are focused on the conduct of COs. This results in 
JP 3–12(R) providing more guidance on the administrative process of integrating 
cyberspace assets and operations into the joint force than on the ways in which 
cyberspace operations can achieve or support a commander’s desired 
objectives. Second, the glossary notes that the terminology updated in JP 1–02 
is the OCO, DCO, and DODIN categorization, and not the cyberspace actions. 
This gives the impression that the former framework is that which is most useful 
for assignment of forces and gaining authority to conduct CO, while the 
cyberspace actions form the framework that is most useful for incorporating CO 
into JO and other specific mission sets. 
2. Joint Publication 3–24, Counterinsurgency 
Given the lack of guidance provided by JP 3–12(R) on how to integrate 
CO into COINs, another place to look for this guidance in joint doctrine is the 
publication on COINs, JP 3–24. Joint publications on COIN from before this 
century did not address cyberspace directly, as it was not as well formed a 
discipline or war-fighting domain as it is now. The DOD has published two 
updated COIN publications in recent years, in October 2009 and November 
2013. While the latest edition of this publication includes more discussion of CO 
than any other joint operations (JO)-specific or mission-set specific joint 
publication, it is the location within joint doctrine where the bulk of guidance on 
how to incorporate CO into COIN is provided. As a result, JP 3–24 deserves the 
most attention of cyberspace planners and operators who are assigned this 
mission. 
The first two chapters in the body of JP 3–24 describe an insurgency and 
present the fundamentals of a COIN, including the tenets of COIN. The next 
three chapters outline the operational environment in which a COIN is conducted, 
and provide general guidance for how a COIN should be planned and assessed. 
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The last two chapters describe the role of supporting operations in a COIN, 
where cyberspace consideration are addressed, and address the governance 
issues relevant to conducting a COIN. While this framework does address 
cyberspace operations, there are three deficiencies in the publication for readers 
seeking guidance on how to support the tenets of COIN with the effects of 
cyberspace operations. 
The first deficiency is the manner in which JP 3–24 presents the tenets of 
COIN. An initial, though relatively minor concern is the fact that the executive 
summary states that there are four tenets of COIN, but the body of the text 
discusses six tenets of COIN in detail. Where the publication discusses the 
tenets in detail, it presents the tenets of COIN as “guideposts for the joint force” 
(USJCS 2013b, III-7), and discusses details of missions ranging from roadblocks 
to Department of Treasury task forces, but does not link the tenets to cyberspace 
operations in any way. The text of the tenets which follows does not include the 
word cyber, and the two places where CO are discussed in any detail only make 
reference to two tenets: Understanding the operational environment (OE), which 
directly addresses CO, and defend the population, which indirectly addresses CO 
through acknowledging that CO can isolate the insurgency. 
The second deficiency is in the generalized guidance that JP 3–24 
provides for conducting CO in a COIN. The sole paragraph that provides this 
guidance only lists three missions for CO: isolating and separating the 
insurgency, denying the enemy freedom of action, and maintaining U.S. and joint 
forces freedom of maneuver (USJCS 2013b, VII-1). By comparison, the guidance 
on air operations covers four pages, addresses a wide array of operations, and 
provides detailed guidance on the conduct of many of these operations. Three 
portions of this publication make the limited attention paid to cyberspace 
operations more striking. First, the cyberspace operations paragraph outlines a 
wider array of mission sets that insurgents may be conducting. While this usefully 
highlights the types of enemy missions that CO can disrupt, it also suggests that 
more guidance can be provided on the mission types that friendly forces can 
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conduct. Second, specific guidance for different mission sets is provided for other 
support activities. One example is the discussion of air support, which includes 
granularity down to the level of specific air support mission sets and the aircraft 
frames appropriate for these missions (USJCS 2013b, VII-2–VII-5). Finally, 
appendix D includes a list of tactical and operations precepts that complement 
the generalized guidance for almost every other form of supporting activity but 
does not address cyberspace operations in any way. 
The third deficiency is in presenting only an intent-based categorization of 
CO and not addressing the effects-based categorization of CO. As discussed, JP 
3–12(R) provides the effects-based categorization for the purposes of linking CO 
to a JFC’s desired effects, but JP 3-24 neglects to use this categorization. By 
comparison, the section on space operations mentions specific effects and links 
them to COIN tenets. If the cyberspace section were robust, and described how 
the effects of these three mission types were to be achieved, or how these three 
mission types complimented the COIN tenets, it may have provided better 
guidance. It not only fails to provide this guidance, but also provides a 
categorization of operations that has notable gaps and contradictions: 
1. The definition of OCO provided in JP 3–24 restricts the conditions 
under which operations may be conducted against an insurgency by stating that 
they can only be conducted in response to a limited number of insurgent uses of 
cyberspace. Specifically, it does not call for OCO to be conducted in response to 
insurgent use of cyberspace to distribute training materials or other similar 
information. If planners relied solely on this publication for guidance, they would 
be precluded from executing missions like the unattributed actions that replaced 
the bomb-making instructions on a terrorist website with a recipe for making 
cupcakes (Spy Blog, 2011). 
2. The definition of DCO that JP 3–24 expands the realm of 
cyberspace in which the military may conduct defensive operations to include 
host nation (HN) cyberspace, but provides limiting and seemingly contradictory 
guidance on the types of operations that may be conducted there. First, it limits 
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DCO to detecting and responding to adversary actions, with no mention of 
proactively hardening systems to withstand adversary actions. While JP 2-13(R) 
addresses this limitation by splitting DCO into internal and external missions, JP 
3-24 does not. This gap indicates that all DCO will be reflexive or responsive. 
Second, the definition then states that these DCO would identify insurgents and 
create conditions for defeating them, which implies that DCO encompasses all 
intelligence gathering and battlefield preparation operations, including those that 
would be traditionally classified as intelligence operations of a decidedly 
offensive nature. This contradiction blurs the lines between JP 3–12(R)’s OCO 
and DCO definitions. 
3. The definition of DODIN operations is replaced with a definition of 
“Building HN Cyberspace Capability” (USJCS 2013b, VII-2). The publication does 
not discuss DODIN operations at all, but provides a subparagraph in its place 
that frames this HN support as the DODIN-equivalent mission in a COIN. This 
definition is again limited in its scope, as it focuses only on strengthening those 
portions of HN cyberspace that are part of or at least loosely affiliated with the 
HN government, with no mention of the HN’s civilian sector. This gap ignores the 
growing trend in building cyberspace capacity, as the growing trend in expanding 
cyberspace capability has been providing standards compliance training and 
infrastructure funding in both Europe (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Industry Cyber Partnership) and the Middle East (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology–Middle East North Africa). 
The result of these oversights, contradictions, and gaps is that JP 3–24 
provides little specific guidance on how CO can produce effects that support a 
COIN. JP 3–24 informs the joint force that “[w]arfare that has the population as 
its focus of operations requires a different mindset and different capabilities than 
warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily” (USJCS 2013b, ix). It 
also discusses the importance of the information environment in winning a COIN, 
and acknowledges the role that cyberspace operations can play. It does not, 
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however, give any guidance to the joint force regarding what these missions look 
like, or what effects they might achieve. 
B. BRANCH-SPECIFIC DOCTRINE 
The net effect of so little mention in doctrine of CO related to the tenets of 
COIN, is that the means with which CO can help achieve COIN ends are not 
sufficiently discussed. In the absence of joint doctrine that discusses the means 
of achieving effects, service publications often provide this information for their 
respective operators. 
The Air Force Doctrine Document, 3–12, Cyberspace Operations, does 
provide limited additional guidance in this respect. The document not only relates 
cyberspace operations to the principles of JO and the tenets of air power 
(Department of the Air Force, 16–19); it provides examples of these relationships 
that include COIN or COIN-like operations conducted by and against the United 
States and its allies. This document does not address COIN tenets directly, and it 
includes some service-specific guidance that may not work well in a joint 
operation, the most notable example of which is the assignment of measuring 
tactical Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) to air-domain ISR assets (Department of the Air Force, 32). While this 
document does not perform a mapping between cyberspace operations and the 
COIN tenets, it offers a vision for how such a mapping may be accomplished. 
Outside of the Air Force’s doctrine, the services provide no additional help 
in mapping cyberspace operations to the COIN tenets. The Army’s doctrine on 
cyberspace operations, Field Manual (FM) 3–38, Cyber Electromagnetic 
Activities, expands on joint doctrine’s definitions of the layers of cyberspace 
(physical, logical, and cyber-persona) and the authorities under which 
cyberspace operations are conducted, but it does not provide any insights into 
effects-based categorization of cyberspace operations. Instead, it repeats the 
process of dividing cyberspace operations into OCO, DCO, and DODIN 
operations. The FM then describes electromagnetic attacks, including examples 
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of the means with which these operations may achieve their ends. The same 
deficiency identified above in JP 3–24 is present in FM 3–38: examples of how to 
achieve effects are provided for all aspects of the publication’s subject, except for 
cyberspace operations. 
Providing less than the Army, the Marines’ Marine Corps Order (MCO) 
3100.4–Cyberspace Operations provides guidance for the manning, acquisition, 
and roles related to the Corps’ cyberspace operations. The order provides some 
guidance on defense of their enterprise network, but neither the order nor any of 
its referenced documents contain guidance on the means of achieving 
cyberspace effects outside of this defensive role. 
The Navy’s equivalent document, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) 
Instruction 3052.2, Cyberspace Policy and Administration within the Department 
of the Navy, is similar to MCO 3100.4, but was written earlier so does not  
provide as much specific guidance and is not linked to the same Joint 
Publications. The Navy is addressing these and other concerns, as stated in  
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/10th Navy’s “Strategic Plan 2015–2020,” by pushing 
for standardization in the methods of conducting and evaluating the success of 
cyberspace operations (Department of the Navy 2015, 17). This may yield insight 
on incorporating CO in COINs in the future, but provides little guidance for Naval 
personnel engaged in current COIN campaigns. 
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT DOCTRINE 
The preceding review demonstrates the main limitations of current 
doctrine, rooted primarily in simply insufficient attention to articulating the full 
potential for applying cyberspace actions for COIN purposes. Joint doctrine only 
provides an intent-based mapping of cyberspace operations to COIN in a 
generalized sense. There is neither guidance on the types of cyberspace effects 
that support COIN tenets nor guidance on how these effects can be achieved. 
The guidance provided by individual branches varies by branch in the degree to 
which effects-based cyberspace operations can be planned, and none of the 
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branches connect cyberspace effects-based planning towards goals unique to 
their domains in a manner that applies to specific campaigns like COINs. The 
following chapter examines the effects that cyberspace operations can achieve in 
support of each the COIN tenets, and determines the degree to which current 
doctrine is insufficient in providing guidance on these effects and their 
contributions to a COIN campaign. 
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This chapter introduces a matrix that maps cyberspace actions against 
COIN tenets. It describes the concept of this mapping, and how this mapping is 
used to evaluate the sufficiency of current doctrine. It explores this sufficiency 
with case examples when available, and determines how significant a 
contribution the effects described in each cell make towards accomplishment of 
COIN tenets. It concludes by introducing the general trends observed in 
conducting the mapping exercise that enable the cells to be categorized and 
prioritized. 
A. THE MAPPING METHOD 
The concept of mapping one list of items to another list, as applied here, 
enables focused attention on a detailed set of intersections of opportunities for 
cyberspace action and counterinsurgency needs. Specifically, this thesis maps 
the cyberspace actions identified in JP 3–12(R) to the COIN tenets identified in 
JP 3–24, as presented in Table 1. The cells at each intersection provide a 
description of the effects that the given cyberspace action may achieve in 
support of the given tenet. 
The cyberspace actions utilized in this matrix are listed in JP 3–12(R), 
Cyberspace Operations. The complete descriptions of these actions are 
contained in Appendix A of this thesis, and are summarized as follows: 
 Cyberspace Defense: “actions normally created within DOD 
cyberspace for securing, operating, and defending the DODIN.” 
 Cyberspace ISR: actions “conducted to gather intelligence that may 
be required to support future operations, including OCO or DCO.” 
 Cyberspace OPE: “non-intelligence actions conducted to plan and 
prepare for potential follow-on military operations.” 
 Cyberspace Attack: “actions that create various direct denial effects 
(e.g., degrade, disrupt, and destroy) in cyberspace,” and includes 
the manipulation of adversary intelligence and information systems 
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that leads to denial in cyberspace or the physical domains (USCJS 
2013a, 2013). 
The tenets of COIN utilized in this matrix are listed in JP 3–24, 
Counterinsurgency. The complete descriptions of these tenets are contained in 
Appendix B of this thesis, and are summarized as follows: 
 Understand the OE: providing a commander with sociocultural 
knowledge, an understanding of the United States’ HN partners, 
preparation for a long-term commitment, U.S. public support, and 
the ability to learn and adapt. 
 Develop the COIN Narrative: developing a narrative that 
contextualizes what the population experiences, legitimizes COIN 
activities, and delegitimizes the insurgency. 
 Primacy of Politics: ensuring that U.S. government and HN political 
objectives guide the COIN approach. 
 Secure the Population: providing human security, physical security, 
and rule of law by legitimizing the HN legal systems, mitigating 
unintended consequences of COIN operations, and isolating the 
insurgency. 
 Synchronize and Integrate LOEs: integrating the efforts of joint 
interagency, multinational, and HN participants towards a common 
purpose. 
 Unity of Command and Unity of Effort: providing unity between 
military forces and interagency partners, coordinating with NGOs, 
and enabling intelligence to drive operations (USCJS 2013b, 2013). 
This chapter explores each of the intersections between the cyberspace 
actions and the COIN tenet. The order in which this thesis examines the 
cyberspace actions is different from the order in which they are listed in JP 3-
12(R). This thesis examines them in the order in which cyberspace actions may 
be planned chronologically. It begins by examining the utility of cyberspace ISR, 
focusing on the way in which cyberspace operations can give a commander a 
view of the OE. It then examines the utility of cyberspace OPE, setting the 
conditions for both future cyberspace operations and achievement of the COIN 
tenets. It then examines the utility of cyberspace defense, exploring the 
contributions that it makes in defending US, HN, and other organization. It 
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concludes by examining the utility of cyberspace attack, focusing on the 
contributions it makes in isolating and defeating an insurgency. 
Table 1.   Mapping of Cyberspace Actions to COIN Tenets 
  Cyberspace Actions 
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B. MATRIX CELL EXPLANATIONS AND CASE STUDY EXAMPLES 
This section describes the mapping of each cyberspace action to the six 
COIN tenets, ordered first by cyberspace action and then by COIN tenet. Each 
examination begins with a general description of the effects that each type of 
cyberspace action can achieve in support of each COIN tenet. The examination 
then explores the degree to which current doctrine already provides this 
guidance. Current doctrine is considered excellent if it both describes the effects 
that cyberspace operations can achieve, and connects these effects with 
accomplishment of the COIN tenets. Current doctrine is considered sufficient if it 
either provides a description of the effects that cyberspace operations can 
achieve in general support of a COIN, or if it links cyberspace operations in 
general to specific COIN tenets. Next, the examination mentions whether case 
examples or proposed models for this type of operation already exist in open-
source information. Finally, the examination explores the degree to which this 
type of operation contributes to a successful COIN campaign. 
1. Cyberspace Action 1: Cyberspace Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Cyberspace ISR collects and analyzes data from a broad range of 
sources. This thesis focuses on the specific effects that are listed in JP 3-12(R), 
and how they contribute to the accomplishment of each of the COIN tenets. 
a. Mapping Cyberspace ISR to Understand the OE 
Cyberspace ISR contributes to a commander’s understanding of the 
Operational Environment by identifying the host nation’s Internet service 
providers (ISPs) and phone companies, evaluating the host nation’s cyberspace 
capabilities, and describing the civilian population’s typical pattern of life. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace ISR and understand the OE. JP 3–12(R) only discusses intelligence 
collection in a general sense, and does not connect intelligence gathering to the 
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OE. It abstracts this discussion away by referring to JP 3–13, Information 
Operations. JP 3–13 only discusses cyberspace operations in the context of a 
simple counting of information technology devices, and cyberspace operations’ 
ability to influence an enemy’s decision-making process. JP 3–24 acknowledges 
that the OE includes cyberspace components like “Internet communications such 
as e-mail and social networking sites” (USJCS 2013b, IV-3), but does not 
address the existence of cyber-unique characteristics of the civilian pattern of life. 
While the publication later states that “the joint force relies on cyberspace to 
develop a clear understanding of the OE” (USJCS 2013b, VII-1), the following 
discussion addresses this understanding only in the context of the insurgents’ 
use of cyberspace technology. None of these publications address aspects of 
this appraisal that are unique to cyberspace, treating the Internet as a mirror of 
previous communication networks, like the telephone system. As a result, they all 
fail to include popular communication applications, cyber personas, and other 
cyber-unique elements that influence the OE. 
There are no published reports of the cyber-specific intelligence that is 
gathered and reported to COIN commanders, likely owing to its classification. In 
open-source information, the intelligence community provides a generalized 
assessment of the communication networks for each nation, maintaining 
databases like the CIA’s World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). 
When a COIN commander is assigned a nation or region, their cyberspace 
professionals may compliment this general communications intelligence with 
details about the region’s cyber infrastructure. This additional intelligence 
addresses the population, the insurgency, and the host nation government. It 
addresses these groups by describing the physical devices, communication 
networks, applications, protocols, websites, and cyber personas that each group 
uses / accesses. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace ISR and understand 
the OE contributes to a COIN campaign is not significant. Current intelligence 
guidance and publically available records already account for much of this 
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information, but including these cyber-specific components helps to paint a more 
complete picture of the OE. 
b. Mapping Cyberspace ISR to Develop the COIN Narrative 
Cyberspace ISR helps craft the COIN narrative by locating the media that 
the insurgency uses to broadcast their narrative in cyberspace, in order to keep 
the command updated about the insurgent messages and responses to COIN 
operations. Cyberspace ISR also analyzes the media that the civilian population 
uses most often, in order to describe the lenses through which the population 
views the insurgency, HN, and COIN forces. This cyber-specific contribution 
entails analysis of the websites, blogs, and images that local IPSs cache the 
most often because they are regularly viewed or updated by either the population 
or insurgency. 
Current doctrine does not provide guidance for the aspects of the 
intersection of cyberspace ISR and develop the COIN narrative that are unique to 
cyberspace. JP 3–12(R) does not address the COIN narrative. In the COIN 
narrative section of JP 3–24, it states that the COIN narrative “should invoke 
relevant cultural and historical references to both justify the actions of 
counterinsurgents and make the case that the government will win” (USJCS 
2013b, II-9). It does not, however, follow this guidance with examples of what 
these references are or how to collect them. In the cyberspace considerations 
section of JP 3–24, it does not address the COIN narrative. 
One example of a group conducting this type of operation is Hezbollah’s 
use of Israeli national symbols in the cyberspace components of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. By using these symbols on their website as part of their 
terrorist narrative, Hezbollah reflects “an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality, where Israelis 
and their American supporters, or else Palestinians and Muslims, are portrayed 
as barbaric, reflecting discourses of inclusion and exclusion” (Karatzogianni 
2008, 6). Tapping into cultural symbols attaches a sense of inclusion between 
the host nation and its population without making such an attachment as overt as 
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calling for support. The United States often has permission to collect information 
that can tell which websites are most commonly accessed, and in some cases 
this information is advertised. Recording the symbols from those on-line sites and 
the personalities that they represent provides information operations 
professionals with a means to increase the public appeal of a COIN 
commander’s narrative. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace ISR and develop the 
COIN narrative contributes to a COIN campaign is moderate. Cyberspace ISR of 
this sort provides the COIN commander with a quantifiable indicator that a 
cultural symbol or reference is popular. This does not guarantee that a reference 
is relevant, but it does contribute to the process of crafting a narrative that uses 
popular symbols. In addition, only cyberspace professionals can collect data 
across an entire nation in a matter of minutes to determine which symbols and 
references a specific audience is interacting with the most. The possibility of 
collecting this information for specific sections of the population, either 
geographically or along other lines, further enables a COIN narrative to appeal to 
its intended audience. 
c. Mapping Cyberspace ISR to Primacy of Politics 
Cyberspace ISR supports the Primacy of Politics by identifying the 
cyberspace challenges and opportunities that accomplishment of HN political 
goals faces. This involves collecting information about the cyber infrastructure of 
the HN that warrants the greatest amount of attention when conducting 
cyberspace OPE. Cyberspace ISR determines if a nation’s civilian Internet 
service providers are conducting their business in a manner that makes it easier 
for insurgent groups to maintain their anonymity. 
Current doctrine does not provide guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace ISR and primacy of politics. JP 3–12(R) does not address HN cyber 
infrastructure. While JP 3–24 discusses building a HN’s cyberspace capability, it 
does not state how that capability is measured before building or enhancing it. 
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Further, there are cases in which a focus only on the expansion of HN 
cyberspace capacity may do more to enable an insurgency than it does to 
legitimize a government. 
One example is an ISP running “open resolver” DNS servers, because 
these allow insurgents to conduct both cache poisoning and low-level denial-of-
service attacks with anonymity. Organizations like the Open Resolver Project 
simplify this process for cyberspace professionals, and present the importance of 
such practices in a manner that is easy for both COIN commanders and HN 
government officials to understand (Open Resolver Project, 2016). 
Current doctrinal analysis frameworks referenced in JP 3-24, like 
ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events) and 
PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) 
(USCJS 2013b, IV-5), have not incorporated all of the information that can be 
collected about a HN’s cyberspace. For example, Cyberspace ISR can contribute 
to better measurement of a HN government’s defenses or cyberspace posture. 
Many scholars have presented matrices and metrics for measuring an agency or 
government’s resilience, but none have been formally integrated into analysis 
frameworks:  
 Linkov et al. introduce a resilience matrix that determines a network’s 
resistance to attack. Their proposed matrix evaluates how each of the four 
domains of network-centric operations would react during the four life-cycle 
stages of resilient systems (Linkov et al 2013, 474).  
 Mattern et al. build off of Lockheed Martin’s kill chain and present a proactive 
“course of action” matrix that can be used to measure progress in 
strengthening a government system (Mattern 2014, 709).  
 Kieffer applies cyberspace IPB to network evaluation, arguing that basic 
network mapping and identification of key administrative accounts / personnel 
are useful measurements (Kieffer 2015, 12).  
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Cyberspace professionals can use tools like these to ascribe the HN a cyber 
resiliency measurement, and add this measurement to assessment frameworks 
like ASCOPE, PMESII, and DIME. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace ISR and primacy of 
politics contributes to a COIN campaign is moderate. It helps measure the 
progress of a HN government’s development well, but only in this cyber-specific 
context. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) postulates that this type of 
evaluation provides a benefit in their efforts to strengthen HN rule of law. As a 
result, the FBI has developed a Cyber Assistant Legal Attaché (ALAT) system, 
which embeds legal professionals with foreign governments to “facilitate 
information sharing, increase cooperation on investigations, and improve 
relationships with foreign partners” (White House 2015). Cyberspace operators 
assigned to work with HN government cyberspace professionals can achieve 
similar benefits by gathering this information while they are providing the HN with 
security training (which is covered in the Cyberspace OPE portion of this thesis). 
d. Mapping Cyberspace ISR to Secure the Population 
Cyberspace ISR helps secure the population by identifying the means 
through which insurgents generate external financial and logistical support, and 
identifying the command and control channels that the insurgency uses. 
Information collected in cyberspace reveals insurgent channels of support both 
inside and outside of cyberspace. Examples of these types of operations include 
detecting and tracing online transactions through banks or cyber-unique 
currencies like Bitcoin, or detecting and tracing the distribution of information on 
the use and maintenance of equipment or weapons unique to the insurgency. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace ISR and secure the population. JP 3–12(R) does not address 
securing a HN population. JP 3–24 states that DCO will detect enemy or 
adversary actions, though it does not say how. This publication also states that 
OCO will be considered if an insurgency uses cyberspace for a range of support 
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functions, but does not mention how these will be detected. JP 3–24 goes on to 
say that DCO will identify insurgent activities, though it is unclear how this will 
happen if DCO is limited to friendly networks, as outlined in the publication 
(USCJS 2013b, VII-21). 
There are multiple case examples of this type of operation being 
conducted. As referenced earlier, an unknown organization (widely suspected to 
be the British intelligence agency) identified that insurgent forces were using the 
periodical “Inspire” to spread both their insurgent narrative and instructions on 
how to make improvised explosives (Flock 2011). Syrian hackers working in 
support of the Assad regime were able to identify the channels through which 
members of ISIS were communicating, and used this information to plant 
malware on an insurgent cell phone (Sanger and Schmitt 2015). United States 
forces can conduct similar operations to identify the channels over which 
insurgent groups are conducting both personal / internal communications, as well 
as the channel(s) through which they transmit their narrative and training 
information. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace ISR and secure the 
population contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. Cyberspace ISR 
supports this COIN tenet directly by providing a COIN commander the ability to 
target insurgent activity in cyberspace. Cyberspace ISR also supports this COIN 
tenet indirectly by generating intelligence about insurgent activity on the ground, 
which supports other operations that can help secure the population. Cyberspace 
ISR also may determine the types of weapon systems being used and other 
technical details about insurgent methods, giving ground forces a tactical 
information advantage in operations that secure the population and achieve other 
effects in support of a COIN. 
e. Mapping Cyberspace ISR to Synchronize and Integrate LOEs 
Cyberspace ISR synchronizes and deconflicts cyberspace operations with 
relevant actors, especially with regard to the intelligence gain / loss (IGL) that 
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may result from conducting cyberspace operations. Examples include weighing 
the benefits gained by denying insurgents the ability to communicate with specific 
devices or protocols or to access specific websites or people, against the 
benefits gained by collecting and analyzing this communications. While 
intelligence agencies provide expertise on the value of a specific source, 
cyberspace professionals provide the commander expertise about the integrity of 
data collected with different devices or means, and the risk of each type of 
collection being detected or compromised. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace ISR and synchronize and integrate LOEs. JP 3–12(R) states that 
intelligence collection should be coordinated with other agencies and actors, but 
discusses the subject in no detail. JP 3–24 discusses intelligence issues but 
does not address the manner in which cyberspace intelligence collection 
operates in relation to other intelligence operations. JP 3–24 discusses 
information operations in great detail, and even discusses the concept of 
“compound strategies” (USJCS 2013b, II-13) but this section does not mention 
cyber. This publication’s cyberspace considerations section does not discuss the 
interaction that may occur between the cyber community and either the 
intelligence or information operations communities. 
There is little public evidence of this type of operation being conducted. 
One example of a campaign not leveraging cyberspace assets to synchronize 
and integrate LOEs was the peacetime IO campaign in Bosnia. The IO and 
military information support operations (MISO) teams conducting operations in 
Bosnia were distributing messages that did not mesh well together and were 
occasionally counter-productive. While the IO and MISO communities eventually 
addressed these concerns by conducting a variety of meetings (Siegel 1998, 
115), a cyber-led framework of storing and sharing messaging among coalition 
forces may have reduced these problems and the energy spent to mitigate them. 
These operations also lacked substantial (MOEs), which led US forces to 
conduct operations that may or may not have been effective (Siegel 1998, 100–
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101). Cyberspace ISR can prevent future instances of this deficiency by 
collecting information from popular websites, recording discussions of IO and 
MISO messages, and analyzing the frequency and character of these 
discussions through means including simple word count and associated 
favorable or unfavorable key words. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace ISR and synchronize 
and integrate LOEs contributes to a COIN campaign depends on the scope of 
the campaign, but rises to a moderate degree of significance at best. Larger 
campaigns will have more actors whose actions will benefit from cooperation and 
a greater amount of useful feedback, but they will have other means of providing 
coordination and measuring performance or effectiveness. 
f. Mapping Cyberspace ISR to Unity of Command and Unity of 
Effort 
Cyberspace ISR provides information for the commander about the 
cyberspace activity of other military forces, government organizations, and 
affiliated international organizations that may help or hinder the commander’s 
goals. Cyberspace ISR also identifies the different communication channels that 
these and other organizations use to transmit or receive information over the 
Internet, so that message distribution is not hindered by unidentified 
incompatibilities between different cyberspace actors. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance on the intersection of 
cyberspace ISR and unity of command and unity of effort. JP 3–12(R) states that 
intelligence collection should be coordinated with other agencies and actors, but 
discusses the subject in no detail. JP 3–24 provides mixed guidance on this cell. 
Where JP 3–24 succeeds is in addressing the second and third order effects of 
cyberspace operations (USJCS 2013b, VII-1), which is a minimal mention of this 
cell. Where JP 3–24 fails is that it addresses the importance of other agencies 
and organizations within an OE, but does not indicate that they will use the 
Internet or that this component of their involvement in the OE should be 
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addressed. By comparison, the maritime considerations section of JP 3-24 
includes other organizations’ use of the ocean, and provides specific guidance on 
“establishment or expansion of maritime domain awareness efforts” (USJCS 
2013b, VII-7). 
There is a model for this intersection. The Air Force has established a 
command that is focused on merging ISR and cyberspace operations. The model 
that they present is to divide cyberspace ISR into ISR collected for cyberspace 
operations, and ISR collected by cyberspace operations. This shift in 
organization would better align cyberspace efforts with intelligence capabilities 
than the present command relationship in which cyberspace operations fall under 
Information Operations by involving them more in the intelligence cycle that is 
identified as a subcomponent of this COIN tenet (USJCS 2013b, III-15). 
Cyberspace professionals can suggest Priority Information Requests (PIRs) to 
enter into the COIN intelligence planning process that perform the two functions 
that the Air Force identified (e.g., collection of intelligence for and by cyberspace 
operations). 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace ISR and unity of 
command and unity of effort contributes to a COIN campaign is moderate. In 
cases where insurgent activity is detected in both cyberspace and physical 
dimensions, this is only a contributing or confirming source of intelligence. In 
cases where insurgent activity is revealed only through on-line activity, well-
crafted priority information requests (PIRs) may give a COIN commander 
valuable insight or warning based on indicators that cannot be measured in any 
other domain. 
2. Cyberspace Action 2: Cyberspace Operational Preparation of 
the Environment (OPE): 
Cyberspace OPE often builds on the information collected by cyberspace 
ISR, and offers unique contributions in a COIN. This thesis explores these 
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contributions, and focuses on their contribution to the accomplishment of each of 
the COIN tenets. 
a. Mapping Cyberspace OPE to Understand the OE 
Cyberspace OPE includes measuring and expanding existing Internet 
capability in the host nation, and ensuring that all relevant stakeholders in the 
nation’s Internet infrastructure and government are connected to the COIN effort. 
Examples include the establishment or strengthening of the host nation 
government’s cyberspace forces, ISPs, and phone companies; ensuring that 
these groups follow as many internationally accepted best practices as possible; 
and ensuring that these groups are trained to recognize and report possible 
illegal / insurgent activity. 
Current doctrine does not provide guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and understand the OE. JP 3–12(R) does not address 
stakeholders in a contested OE. JP 3–24 discusses the importance of non-state 
actors within the OE, but does not discuss ways in which US forces can engage 
with them in a cyberspace context. 
There have already been examples of this type of preparation in the 
Middle East. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
Jordan Institute for Standards and Metrology (JISM) held a conference in 2010 
that addressed the infrastructure of the Middle East / North African (MENA), and 
its compliance with a range of standards (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 2010). This conference was focused on a wide range of standards, 
and has not been repeated in the region. While compelling another agency to 
conduct international committees is outside of a COIN commander’s authority, 
applying a similar strategy to meet with the government and industry leaders of a 
host nation is possible. Cyberspace professionals can also work with contracting 
professionals in the commander’s staff to include NIST standards as a 
requirement for the infrastructure development that the DOD provides, and can 
work with other agencies to encourage them to take similar steps. 
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The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace OPE and understand 
the OE contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. Civilian cyberspace 
devices and networks that are properly configured limit the number of locally 
exploitable cyberspace assets that insurgents can use to channel information or 
conduct attacks. Local businesses that detect and report insurgent behavior in 
their networks or on their devices will help the COIN commander collect 
intelligence that is unavailable through non-cyber means. Further, ensuring that 
local businesses meet NIST and other international bodies’ requirements for 
conducting business strengthens the economy and provides more legitimate 
opportunities for the local population to succeed. This helps reduce the number 
of disadvantaged members of the population who may support or join an 
insurgent organization. 
b. Mapping Cyberspace OPE to Develop the COIN Narrative 
Cyberspace OPE ensures that the government is able to disseminate its 
messaging directly to the public through the channels that they most often use. 
While these channels may vary by region or nation, once cyberspace 
professionals have identified the on-line arenas that are most popular with the 
HN population, they ensure that the HN government has access to these 
channels. 
Current doctrine does not provide guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and develop the COIN narrative. JP 3–12(R) does not address 
the COIN narrative or the conditions that would best enable a COIN commander 
or HN to transmit it. JP 3–24 focuses on the distribution of the COIN narrative 
when it states, “the compelling aspect of the narrative is not only in its content, 
but how it is presented (i.e., promoted and publicized) to the target audience, 
which normally requires ideological leaders (USJCS 2013b, II-4).” It does not, 
however, propose any aspects of transmitting this narrative other than the 
requirement that ideological leaders be involved. 
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One example of directing messaging through popular channels is the 
Yemeni Prime Minster’s communications with the public through Facebook. Upon 
taking office, Prime Minister Khalid Mahfoud Bahah used Facebook to explain 
the reasoning and justification behind his decision to shuffle many cabinet 
members aside. He then solicited recommendations from the public for who 
should fill the vacancies in his cabinet. This direct engagement was hailed by 
many media observers in the country as a culturally sensitive move that 
appealed to the public, and it also gave the population a way to air their 
grievances (Al Batati 2014). 
Cyberspace professionals are not required to recommend which types of 
communication and appeals the government expresses to the public, but they 
should ensure that the government is prepared to send these appeals to as wide 
an audience as possible. They accomplish this by ensuring that the HN is aware 
of these channels, and has an account ready to use to broadcast over these 
channels. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace OPE and develop the 
COIN narrative contributes to a COIN campaign is moderate. There are other 
means through which to convey a COIN narrative, but these types of operations 
give the HN government and COIN commander a means of conveying their 
narrative and other communications through the channels that are becoming 
increasingly popular and significant. 
c. Mapping Cyberspace OPE to Primacy of Politics 
Cyberspace OPE supports the primacy of politics by strengthening the 
portions of a host nation’s government and nationwide cyber infrastructure that 
are vulnerable to attack. One way that these vulnerabilities are located and 
mitigated is through conducting DCO war games, in which friendly hackers 
identify weaknesses in the host nation’s cyber infrastructure, and recommend 
changes that need to be made. These recommendations often include changes 
to network architecture, security procedures, and bandwidth/capacity. 
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Current doctrine does not provide guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and primacy of politics. JP 3–12(R) does not address HN 
governments’ political goals or legitimacy as a planning or operational 
consideration. JP 3–24 presents the view that understanding the OE in a COIN 
“poses a particular challenge for the JFC, as it is difficult to analyze one’s own 
actions with the same objectivity as the JFC is able to apply to the decision 
making of others (USJCS 2013b, IV-12).” In cyberspace, these rules are less 
applicable, because these objectivity concerns are largely eliminated through the 
conduct of DCO exercises. 
NATO is already conducting DCO exercises like these on an annual basis. 
Named “Operation Locked Shields,” this exercise continues to increase the 
sophistication of the simulated attacks and the number of participating nations 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of 
Excellence 2014). When a COIN commander is ordered to assist a nation that 
does not participate in exercises like these, they should include the host nation in 
existing exercises or develop new exercises. 
One potential source of information on which to base these exercises is 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guide for evaluating system 
vulnerabilities, which was recently praised by the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) (Office of the Inspector General 2014). The utility of the DHS’ system has 
been addressed in by Sandia Laboratories (Mateski et al 2012), and similar 
vulnerability assessments are referenced in academic papers measuring 
operational levels of cyber intelligence (Mattern et al 2014, 707–708, and 715–
716). Between the DHS’ well-reviewed guide and the equivalent assessments 
proposed, there are frameworks available for a commander to use in developing 
a white-hat exercise if the supported HN government is unable or unwilling to 
work with NATO. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace OPE and primacy of 
politics contributes to a COIN campaign is moderate. If an insurgency is able to 
deface HN government websites or transmit false messages with compromised 
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HN social media accounts, they may weaken the HN government’s perceived 
legitimacy. Helping a HN to enhance the security of their cyberspace 
infrastructure can prevent or mitigate these effects. 
d. Mapping Cyberspace OPE to Secure the Population 
Cyberspace OPE helps to secure the population by distributing friendly IO 
messages and countering insurgent messaging. Proactive examples of this 
include sending text messages or emails to specific populations that help support 
the legitimacy of the host nation government or that provide behavioral changes 
that will make insurgent activity easier to detect. Reactive examples of this 
include responding to inaccurate or misleading insurgent messages. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and secure the population. JP 3–12(R) does not address the 
manner by which cyberspace professionals prepare a commander for messaging 
campaigns. JP 3–24 includes a section in which it “Describe[s] the Impact of the 
Operational Environment on Adversary and Friendly Capabilities (USJCS 2013b, 
IV-12–IV-15),” but it only provides a list of insurgent uses of cyberspace and the 
effects they can achieve. It does not give a similar list for what a COIN 
commander can do or achieve. 
One example of proactive communications is the publically declared 
methods under which the HN will accept the surrender of insurgent forces. India 
faces various insurgencies in its northeast territories, and has publically posted 
its surrender policy on the Internet (Government of India). Many groups have 
surrendered themselves to the government under these clearly stated terms. The 
Aceh government has communicated directly with some of the insurgents it has 
faced, and this direct offer of a negotiated surrender has worked to bring in the 
country’s most wanted insurgent leader (Simanjuntak 2015). Cyberspace 
professionals distribute the messages that the HN and COIN commanders 
prepare and ensure that they are distributed over the channels that are most 
often viewed by target portions of the population or insurgency. 
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One example of reactive communications is the counter-propaganda 
campaign of Malaysia in the 1980s. In that insurgency, British forces identified 
the channels that insurgents were using to broadcast their propaganda, and 
immediately responded to insurgent propaganda with their own messages. The 
Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) was pushed to invest significant resources 
countering this effort because the British enabled local Chinese and ex-MCP 
members to immediately respond to insurgent messages and to create their own 
(Ong 2010, 39–40). Cyberspace professionals have the opportunity to prepare 
the operational environment by identifying the forums where these conversations 
are already being had, and to help direct responsive messaging more effectively 
towards thwarting insurgent propaganda. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace OPE and secure the 
population contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. JP 3–24 recognizes the 
importance of enabling communication with insurgents by observing that “most 
insurgency solutions involve some sort of political compromise and are rarely a 
“winner take all” situation (USJCS 2013b, III-10–III-11).” This form of OPE 
enables compromise on an individual level; subverting individual members of an 
insurgency even when an insurgent organization is unwilling to compromise. 
e. Mapping Cyberspace OPE to Synchronize & Integrate LOEs 
Cyberspace OPE includes the process of defining which portions of 
cyberspace the commander can act in, and which actions they can conduct. This 
range of actions will stem from United States codes and laws, but will be 
modified by agreements with host and other nations, cooperation with other U.S. 
and third-party agencies, and the private companies acting within the host nation. 
Deconflicting responsibilities ahead of time in cyberspace may look similar to 
deconflicting fires in traditional joint operations, but it may also have unique 
aspects that make examples of this process difficult to identify. 
Current doctrine provides extensive guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and synchronize and integrate LOEs. JP 3–12(R) contains 
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extensive guidance for Cyber Support Elements (CSEs), and how they should 
coordinate their efforts with other government agencies (USJCS 2013a, III-6). JP 
3–24 does not expand on this guidance to state whether there are any additional 
requirements in a COIN environment, and the OE of each COIN can vary widely 
enough that this omission appears wise. 
Cyber teams that are assigned to COIN campaigns integrate their efforts 
with the rest of the fight through different liaisons and efforts. One proven model 
for how this integration is to include a cyberspace professional in COIN fusion 
cells, based on the way in which this has worked for Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dinerman 2015). This SOF model has been 
suggested as a model for cyber teams to use in integrating their operations with 
COIN LOEs because of similarities between these two types of warriors—their 
methods are not well understood by conventional forces, they operate out of 
separated bases or parts of bases, and they work in a more covert manner than 
other forces (Dinerman 2015). Cyberspace operators who have representatives 
in a fusion cell coordinate their efforts with other parts of the COIN force to 
contribute more of the nation’s cyberspace resources to a COIN campaign. 
While current doctrine provides extensive guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and synchronize and integrate LOEs, the contribution of this 
cell to a COIN campaign is minimal. The importance of linking operations and 
objectives as suggested in this cell is vital, but that is an understood component 
of military operations in general. The contribution of formalizing the guidance 
identified by this cell would be to formalize and give permanence to this type of 
coordination. 
f. Mapping Cyberspace OPE to Unity of Command and Unity of 
Effort 
Cyberspace OPE supports a commander by ensuring that friendly forces 
are able to maintain freedom of movement across the cyberspace domain. 
Examples of this include gaining permission to use private cyber infrastructure 
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within the host nation, and identifying routes that data must travel to avoid 
nations that do not grant the United States the cyberspace equivalent of “fly over” 
rights in cyberspace communications between the host nation and the United 
States. 
Current doctrine provides minimal guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace OPE and unity of command and unity of effort. JP 3-12(R) states that 
cyberspace operations require unity of effort, but it only describes how unity of 
effort can be achieved can be achieved for centralized missions like global 
defense. The publication states that any further command and control of 
cyberspace forces will be outlined in the concept of operations (CONOPS) and 
operation orders (OPORDS) published by a JFC (USJCS 2013a, II-6-II-7). JP 3-
24 does not provide guidance on the preparation of cyberspace for conducting 
COIN operations. While there is guidance that this coordination will occur, it has 
come so recently that doctrine has not provided guidance for how this will occur.  
The Secretary of Defense has mandated inclusion of cyberspace 
operations into Unity of Command and Unity of Effort. The new cyberspace 
model approved in June 2013 by the Secretary of Defense is a “Direct Support” 
C2 model that provides direct support to combatant commanders through four 
service-specific Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C), and also has 
classified components (Department of Defense 2014, 10). Given the military-
specific nature of this model, it is likely designed to address a COIN 
commander’s concerns related to coordination with only U.S. and other allied 
forces. This model may also either address coordination with NGOs and 
inclusion of cyberspace operations in the intelligence-driven operations process, 
or provide a model for what that coordination looks like. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace OPE and unity of 
command and unity of effort contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. 
Gaining the authority to use other nation’s cyberspace in a “flyover” capacity 
prevents or mitigates international disagreement. Gaining the authority to work 
with local, private cyberspace actors expands the scope of cyberspace 
  40
professionals’ ability to collect intelligence and ensures that best practices are 
being conducted. Both intelligence and best practices have been mentioned 
earlier—proper coordination not only enables planned COIN operations, but 
opens channels for local, private input that may yield additional opportunities. 
3. Cyberspace Action 3: Cyberspace Defense 
Cyberspace defense can begin without any OPE, but may be more 
effective if cyberspace ISR and OPE have been conducted. This thesis explores 
the range of effects that cyberspace defense can achieve in a COIN, and focuses 
on their contribution to the accomplishment of each of the COIN tenets. 
a. Mapping Cyberspace Defense to Understand the OE 
Commanders expect to know the vulnerabilities of friendly military bases 
and critical infrastructure, and that there are plans in place to defend these sites 
if they are attacked. Cyberspace Defense provides equivalent information and 
planning in cyberspace by identifying the critical cyberspace capabilities and 
vulnerabilities of both civilian infrastructure and government systems within a 
host nation, and preparing defenses of these systems in case of attack. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace defense and understand the OE. Both Joint Publications avoid 
discussion of cyberspace actions in privately owned cyberspace. While there are 
limits on the military’s ability to act in United States citizens’ privately owned 
cyberspace, there are precedents for civilian actors pursuing government 
intervention, but there is no doctrinal answer for the means by which a COIN 
commander would respond to such requests. 
Previously mentioned efforts like Operation Locked Shields help a HN to 
identify the vulnerabilities that it has in some of its infrastructure and most of its 
government-run systems. One example of addressing identified weaknesses was 
the Polish cyberspace defense effort in the wake of hacking incidents against 
Estonia, Ukraine, and the Polish energy infrastructure (van Blommestein 2014, 
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1). Poland refined its internal legal definitions, published security guidelines for 
public administration users, joined NATO’s CCDCOE, incentivized Polish 
universities to develop new cryptography systems, and introduced a new phone 
security system (van Blommestein 2014, 2–5). Cyberspace defense supports 
COIN by identifying which systems are vulnerable, and addressing these 
weaknesses with as many measures as possible. While a supported HN may not 
be able to join a NATO team or possess a university system capable of 
developing new cryptography system, a partial or equivalent set of measures 
provides a COIN commander with a picture of a nation’s weaknesses and the 
efforts taken to address them. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace defense and 
understand the OE contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. In addition to 
any benefit that local, private cyberspace actors may receive and render from 
interactions planned by a COIN commander, this type of interaction opens the 
door to American businesses’ best practices being shared with private 
businesses within a COIN OE. If local businesses adopt new security protocols 
and encryption standards as a result of engagement, they will connect their new 
capabilities with the COIN effort, which may make them more receptive to other 
coordination and support activities in the future. 
b. Mapping Cyberspace Defense to Develop the COIN Narrative 
This intersection is not addressed because there is no logical way to map 
this cyberspace action to this COIN tenet. There is no portion of the HN 
government, civilian cyberspace infrastructure, or the DODIN that is used to 
develop or disseminate the COIN narrative that is not already accounted for in 
the mapping of cyberspace defense to other COIN tenets. While the successful 
defense of these networks against attack may validate the COIN narrative, it 
does not contribute to its development. 
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c. Mapping Cyberspace Defense to Primacy of Politics 
U.S. cyberspace operators assess the likely threats posed to the DODIN 
and HN by the enemy. They execute operations that defend the DODIN and HN 
either through local means, or in coordination with the strategic teams assigned 
to defend the DODIN at the national level. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace defense and primacy of politics. JP 3–24 provides guidance that 
DCO are conducted to defend friendly networks, which can be reasonably 
assumed to include all government cyberspace activity. It then links these effects 
this to primacy politics by stating that DCO will protect HN governance and 
sovereignty. 
One recent example of cyberspace defense operations that supported the 
primary of politics was the Ukrainian defense of their election results system in 
2014. This election was a critical event in maintaining the legitimacy of the 
Ukrainian government in the wake of the relatively new Russian-backed 
insurgency in with Eastern provinces. Approximately 72 hours before the election 
the hacker group CyberBerkut attacked the election results distribution system, 
destroying software, hardware, router settings, and even the system’s main 
backup (Coker and Sonne 2015, 1–2). Ukrainian cyberspace defenders 
responded to the attack and were able to both repair the damage done and 
strengthen the system against future attacks. While there were still some attacks 
that day, including a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack that did no 
damage and a DNS spoofing attack that was quickly remedied, the election 
results were distributed nation-wide, and the potential damage was minimized 
(Coker and Sonne 2015, 6–7). 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace defense and primacy 
of politics contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. The actions in Ukraine 
provide a perfect example of a case in which no portion of national power except 
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cyberspace operations could defend against an attack that threatened to weaken 
both a nation’s political system and its legitimacy. 
d. Mapping Cyberspace Defense to Secure the Population 
Cyberspace defense operations do not provide human and physical 
security directly, instead securing the population indirectly by isolating the 
insurgency, protecting friendly cyberspace capabilities, and mitigating 
cyberspace vulnerabilities in all layers of cyberspace. These operations reduce 
the number of networks that can be manipulated to aid malicious cyberspace 
activity, and collect forensic evidence that helps identify the source of insurgent 
malicious activity. 
Current doctrine provides extensive guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace defense and secure the population. JP 3–24 address the importance 
of this type of operation, with special notice paid to the importance of stopping 
insurgent criminal activity in cyberspace. This cell represents one of the few 
cases in which doctrine provides examples not only of how insurgents use 
cyberspace to achieve their objectives, but also how this creates possibilities for 
cyberspace professionals to contribute to COIN campaigns. 
One example of cyberspace defense securing the population is the 
international response to Ukraine’s insurgency. This response includes funding 
and training towards bolstering the cyberspace defenses of Ukraine’s civilian 
sector. Romania spearheads these efforts, providing the bulk of the money and 
technical expertise provided to Ukraine through the Ukraine Cyber Defense Trust 
Fund (Fiscutean 2015). Romania provides an excellent model for providing 
cyberspace defenses specifically geared towards the COIN tenet of securing the 
population for two reasons. First, they support the safety of the population 
directly through their innovative “Bitdefender Box,” which is made specifically for 
home networks (Mutler 2015). Second, they provide support to strengthening the 
rule of law through the work of their cyber-savvy police force’s contribution to 
Europol efforts in the nation (Mutler 2015). 
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The United States also possesses significant cyberspace defense 
expertise in its public and private arenas, which it can apply and share with HN 
partners in a COIN. The Department of Homeland Security has consolidated the 
largest portion of the nation’s defensive cyberspace resources under its Cyber 
Defense Initiative. In addition to this initiative, the Department of Defense 
recently reorganized its DODIN operations under a Joint Task Force (JTF)-
DODIN. The JTF-DODIN has expanded its capabilities by incorporating and 
combining resources from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), 
cyber command, and other military services (Miller). Between the expanded 
capabilities of the JTF-DODIN and the workshops and other resources from the 
DHS’ CDI, US cyberspace professionals have many resources to apply in 
securing the population and strengthening the rule of law within a HN. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace defense and secure 
the population contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. Preventing an 
insurgency from exploiting local cyberspace actors is one of the core 
contributions that cyberspace professionals make in supporting a COIN 
campaign. Successful defense of local cyberspace actors both legitimizes the 
government and reinforces the COIN narrative, separating the insurgency from 
the local population. 
e. Mapping Cyberspace Defense to Synchronize and Integrate 
LOEs 
Cyberspace defense operations are conducted to ensure friendly freedom 
of movement across the DODIN and host nation cyberspace, so that all forces 
within the command can communicate freely with U.S. and host nation forces. 
Examples include identifying and securing vulnerabilities in communication 
software, identifying “bottlenecks” of limited bandwidth so that infrastructure 
projects are better prioritized, and standardizing protocols or developing 
translation algorithms to minimize compatibility issues between different systems’ 
communication protocols. 
  45
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace defense and synchronize and integrate LOEs. JP 3–12(R) and JP 3–
24 state that this is one of the core functions that cyber forces contribute to a 
supported commander. JP 3–24 also provides a brief description of how cyber 
crime negatively impacts the OE, which tells cyberspace defenders which 
activities they should prepare to thwart. The only failing of these publications is 
that neither one addresses the possibility of more sophisticated attacks coming 
from a COIN OE. This has not yet occurred, but it is a possibility which doctrine 
should address. 
There are many examples of civilian companies reviewing the logs 
collected by other companies or by government agencies. Companies like 
Splunk provide Security Incident Event Monitoring to address the inability of local 
or small businesses to conduct thorough analysis of all logs. Splunk’s 
terminology, taken from their corporate tag line is that they provide this service 
because “ninjas are too busy (Splunk 2016).” NIST guidelines for computer 
security log management echo this approach, advising that an organization 
prioritize log management appropriately throughout the organization by 
“establishing log management duties at both the individual system level and the 
log management infrastructure level (Kent and Souppaya 2006, ES-2).” 
This division of labor is consistent with traditional military echelons of 
responsibility and can exist between a local COIN commander’s cyber teams and 
the national cyber centers. In response to a new threat, the cyberspace team 
assigned to a commander prepares defenses and coordinates immediate 
response. Higher headquarters or echelons then provide assistance in log 
analysis and data correlation by comparing local threats against global trends 
and sharing lessons learned form local COINs with the rest of the DOD cyber 
community. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace defense and 
synchronize and integrate LOEs contributes to a COIN campaign is largely 
determined by the sophistication of the enemy, and there have been no case 
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examples where this analysis would have provided a significant contribution. In 
situations like the aforementioned CyberBerkut attack against Ukraine, the only 
challenge for cyberspace defenders is to generate an immediate response. More 
sophisticated attacks are not common, but when they occur, it is much easier to 
detect them and defend against them with the help of centralized log analysis 
element. 
f. Mapping Cyberspace Defense to Unity of Command and Unity 
of Effort 
Cyberspace operators support Unity of Command and Unity of Effort by 
maintaining friendly freedom of movement across the DODIN and between 
friendly forces, other government organizations (OGOs), and any relevant non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Examples include maintenance of friendly 
physical cyber architecture, continued access to venues for sharing information 
with relevant OGOs and NGOs, and publishing protocol standards for all friendly 
cyberspace communications. 
Current doctrine provides minimal guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace defense and unity of command and unity of effort. While both JP 3–
12(R) and JP 3–24 address the freedom of action for US and allied forces, they 
do not speak to the freedom of action for unaffiliated actors. This may be due in 
part to an aversion to give guidance about military actions outside of United 
States Code authority, but as discussed earlier, there may be a request from 
private or outside, unaffiliated actors to provide this service. 
This thesis has already mentioned the input from OGOs like 
openresolver.com, but there are many other OGOs, companies, and government 
agencies whose cyberspace security interests align with the DOD’s. Cyberspace 
professionals tap into these different organizations when and if their help is 
needed and their interests align. 
There are examples of this type of partnership in both addressing 
temporary issues and forming more permanent organizational alignments. A 
  47
recent example of corporate-government partnership in addressing insurgent 
operations is the cooperative investigation into ISIS’ acquisition of vehicles, 
where the Department of Treasury and Toyota are working together to trace 
vehicle sales and transport (Luibrand 2015). A recent model of organizational 
partnership is the newly created National Background Investigations Bureau 
(NBIB). Under this model, the DOD provides the security and infrastructure 
around which the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)’s Federal Investigative 
Service (FIS) conducts and stores its investigations (Goldstein 2016). 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace defense and unity of 
command and unity of effort contributes to a COIN campaign is moderate. While 
outside actors may fall victim to cyber crime, which aids an insurgency, local 
defensive measures will likely not prevent the majority of an insurgent group’s 
cyber crime activity. There is some benefit from working with other agencies that 
share common goals, so that they can contribute to the COIN campaign without 
as much interruption by insurgent groups. 
4. Cyberspace Action 4: Cyberspace Attack 
Cyberspace attack includes the direct denial of insurgent uses of 
cyberspace, as well as the manipulation of insurgent cyber infrastructure. This 
thesis explores the range of effects that cyberspace attack can achieve in a 
COIN, and focuses on their contribution to the accomplishment of each of the 
COIN tenets. 
a. Mapping Cyberspace Attack to Understand the OE 
Cyberspace attack contributes to a commander’s understanding of the OE 
by placing physical devices in key points of the physical layer of cyberspace in 
the target nation, or by placing logical capabilities on systems that are key points 
in either the physical or logical layer of cyberspace. Examples include packet 
sniffers that relay data to a centralized collection point, or accounts created by 
U.S. cyberspace actors that could both grant access to view data on specific 
systems and deliver effects via cyberspace in future operations. 
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Current doctrine provides no guidance for the intersection of cyberspace 
attack and understand the OE. The term that is used in a wide range of joint and 
service publications to describe devices like these is “sensors.” JP 3–12(R) only 
mentions sensors three times, and only does so to say that sensor data should 
be shared and relayed. JP 3–24 addresses sensors once, to say that they help 
build a common operating picture (COP). Given the library of doctrinal guidance 
on the placement and use of sensors across multiple domains, this lack of 
guidance on sensors in the cyber domain is striking. 
There are open-source programs underway in the U.S. government, like 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)’s Cyber-attack 
Automated Unconventional Sensor Environment (CAUSE), which “aims to 
develop and test new automated methods that forecast and detect cyberspace 
attacks significantly earlier than existing methods” (Intelligence Advanced 
Research Projects Activity 2016). Determining where to place sensors or collect 
data is a process that is unique to each nation and threat, so these types of 
operations will be strongly connected to establishing the patterns of life of both 
groups to make anomalous behavior more obvious. 
There are no instances of covert operations to collect data publically 
shared and acknowledged by the United States, but there are some examples of 
this behavior not being conducted. Insurgent groups like Boko Haram leave 
digital traces like everyone else, yet the African nations fighting them are not 
collecting even open-source forms of this data, to their detriment (Ajike 2015, 
32). Whether or not the United States and its HN allies are repeating this mistake 
is not a matter of public record, though this type of data collection represents a 
cyberspace operation that can provide a COIN commander with a significant 
edge. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace attack and understand 
the OE contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. Just as ground sensors, 
imagery, and signals intelligence have collected information about impending 
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attacks in the past, cyberspace sensors provide a COIN commander with 
valuable warning about attacks in both the cyber and physical domains. 
b. Mapping Cyberspace Attack to Develop the COIN Narrative 
This intersection is not addressed because there is no logical way to map 
this cyberspace action to this COIN tenet. There is no component of drafting or 
delivering the COIN narratives of the HN or COIN commander that requires the 
denial or manipulation of adversary computer systems. 
c. Mapping Cyberspace Attack to Primacy of Politics 
Cyberspace attack supports the Primacy of Politics by denying insurgents 
the ability to significantly impact HN or other friendly actors via cyberspace. 
Examples include taking control of malicious botnets, deactivating or 
reconfiguring compromised components of cyberspace, or limiting insurgent 
freedom of movement over cyberspace by reconfiguring routers to ignore data 
from insurgent devices. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace attack and primacy of politics, as it describes some effects that 
cyberspace attack can achieve, but does not connect these effects to the 
primacy of politics. JP 3–12(R) does not address a HN government’s legitimacy 
or the HN population. JP 3–24 provides targets for OCO (insurgent resources, 
digital media, and “training, communication, and planning capabilities” (USJCS 
2013b, VII-1), but it does not provide examples of the operations that would 
reduce insurgent ability to attack the government or its policies, like the 
destruction of enemy botnets, or the reconfiguration of HN cyber infrastructure. 
Microsoft and the FBI have destroyed many botnets over the last few 
years (Mick 2011), and these two groups have recently formed a coalition with 
Interpol to enhance their ability to do so (Brand 2015). There is also a growing 
body of work showing how malicious botnets can be captured and repurposed to 
work for businesses and governments (Stone-Gross et al 2009). Cyberspace 
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professionals prevent insurgent groups from attacking the HN government by 
applying similar methods in their COIN campaign. 
Limiting insurgent freedom of movement in cyberspace takes many forms. 
A blunt form of this is the government of Iraq’s actions to block many forms of 
private communications to stop insurgent communications (Smith, 2014), though 
this also affects the population, so this method many not be preferred in some 
COIN campaigns. A more subtle form of blocking may be to limit certain content 
or a narrow band of Internet activity, which is viewed in many contexts as a 
legitimate state control of online activity (Zittrain and Palfrey 2010, 44–45). An 
even more subtle approach that cyberspace professionals can use in support of 
a COIN is to leverage local ISPs to help crack through encryption and 
anonymizing programs like The Onion Router (TOR), though more sophisticated 
malicious cyberspace actors may be able to subvert this effort (Whitwam 2015). 
This wide spectrum of blocking options presents many venues for cyberspace 
attack to either restrict insurgent freedom of movement, or use the intelligence 
gained by decrypting encrypted insurgent communications to generate targeting 
information. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace attack and primacy of 
politics contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. Social media is one of the 
most effective tools in insurgents’ cyber arsenal. Successful cyberspace attack 
limits insurgent use of social media, blunting or subverting this two powerful tool 
of an insurgency. 
d. Mapping Cyberspace Attack to Secure the Population 
Cyberspace attack secures the population by isolating insurgent devices 
and communication channels, preventing insurgents from causing human and 
physical damage, and by attacking insurgent methods and resources. Examples 
include distributing insurgent IP / MAC address information to partnering private / 
host nation agents, denial of service attacks that prevent insurgents from using 
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their devices on the Internet, or tracking insurgent financial activity on line for 
follow-on attacks or other actions as the commander sees fit. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace attack and secure the population, as it describes some effects that 
cyberspace attack can achieve, but does not connect these effects to securing 
the population. JP 3–12(R) does not address the COIN dynamic of isolating the 
enemy or defending HN civilian infrastructure. JP 3–24 does address these 
issues, and describes one of the effects that cyberspace attack can achieve by 
stating that cyberspace operations can deny an insurgency freedom of action in 
cyberspace (USJCS 2013b, VII-1). In its discussion of effects, JP 3–24 only 
focuses on denying insurgents freedom of action on cyberspace, without 
addressing the ways that cyberspace attack can disrupt or destroy stationary 
resources of an insurgent organization with cyberspace operations. These may 
be viewed as extensions of denying the insurgents freedom of action, but the 
language of JP 3–24 is focused on the flow of data (data in transit), and not on 
insurgent data that is not being transmitted (data at rest). 
Independent actors have already shown that insurgents are vulnerable to 
cyberspace attacks that can achieve these effects. Anonymous has publicized its 
successful attacks against ISIS websites (Griffin 2015), and the Jester has 
demonstrated multiple ways in which he has been able to deny safe haven to 
terrorists (O’Connor and Shinberg 2011, 4). Better-resourced and more 
organized actors like the Financial Action Task Force have shown that even the 
sophisticated financial support networks of ISIS can be targeted to disrupt their 
financial flows, deprive them of resources, and prevent them from abusing 
financial sectors, limit their ability to sell cultural artifacts, and limit the 
humanitarian consequences for the population (Financial Action Task Force 
2015, 32–38). Cyberspace professionals conducting these OCOs can isolate the 
insurgency from its external resources while minimizing the impact on the 
population. 
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The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace attack and secure the 
population contributes to a COIN campaign is significant. Cyberspace attack 
shuts down an insurgent group’s ability to communicate, isolating the group from 
outside support and possibly isolating individual members from the rest of the 
insurgency. In addition to this contribution, cyberspace attacks turn the tables on 
insurgent attempts to delegitimize a HN government, by showing the HN 
population how vulnerable to attack insurgent funds and websites are. 
e. Mapping Cyberspace Attack to Synchronize and Integrate 
LOEs 
Cyberspace attack supports the synchronization and integration of LOEs 
by coordinating activity with all friendly cyberspace actors. Examples include 
channelizing insurgent use of cyberspace to those channels that U.S. agencies 
are best able to monitor, and collecting intelligence for other operations by 
infiltrating e-mail servers used by insurgents. 
Existing doctrine provides minimal guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace attack and synchronize and integrate LOEs. JP 3–24 discusses the 
second and third order effects of cyberspace actions (USJCS 2013b, VII-2) and 
later discusses how “barriers to classification, connectivity challenges, and a lack 
of understanding of the multitude of available systems can lead to stove-piping 
and/or loss of information (USJCS 2013b, IV-6).” Connecting these separated 
portions of the publication give some guidance to prevent conflicting fires, but 
does not address the possibility of channelizing information to provide 
opportunities for greater intelligence collection. 
Public media reporting indicates that operations like this are already 
underway in the global campaign against ISIS. The success of Anonymous and 
other actors to complicate insurgent use of Twitter (Smith, 2015) has pushed 
ISIS to use other channels of communication, which is a good example of 
channelizing insurgent communications. One option that ISIS has turned to is a 
new service which offers encrypted communications, called Telegraph (Reisinger 
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2015). Another option that ISIS has employed is launching a satellite from Mosul 
in 2014 (Flanagan 2014). These options help avoid the nuisance of Anonymous, 
but centralize insurgent communications in ways that can be monitored, co-
opted, or deactivated by technologically savvy operators like those in the United 
States or other governments. 
There are recent examples of commanders facing challenges when their 
communication channels are limited. The Indian battle against Maoist insurgents 
illustrates the problem of receiving information, as its northern provinces have 
few roads, cell phone towers, or even phone lines. As a result, “by the time the 
intelligence reaches the agency, too often it has become stale and useless for 
undertaking any operation (Mitra 2014).” The success of the Santos 
administration to coordinate peace with the FARC illustrates the vulnerability of 
an insurgency with limited communication channels. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) Policy Center notes that while the FARC was still 
militarily powerful, in the years leading up to the peace talks, “the group had 
suffered a dramatic reduction of its contingent, a loss of political legitimacy, had 
its leaders murdered and its mobility and communication seriously compromised 
(Dario 2014, 8),” which had placed them in a situation where the FARC were 
“increasingly at risk of fragmentation. (Dario 2014, 8).” 
In addition to these examples, there are theoretical models that make a 
strong case for communication channelization being specifically well-suited to 
fighting insurgencies. One of these theoretical models is using “Black PSYOPS” 
to co-opt terrorist propaganda channels. These types of operations would both 
erode an insurgent group’s faith in its communication channels and complicate 
the organization’s future communications (Mugg 2007, 26). The proposed 
circumstances under which a nation may choose to pursue this type of operation 
are limited because of access to these communications and the competence of 
the nation coopting these communications (Mugg 2007, 5–6), which are both 
concerns that channelized communications mitigates. This type of operation is 
specifically attractive for COINs where the population does not have confidence 
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in the HN government (Mugg 2007, 5), which is common scenario for COIN 
commanders to face. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace attack and 
synchronize and integrate LOEs contributes to a COIN campaign ranges from 
minimal to moderate, depending on the degree to which an insurgency relies 
upon channels of communication that can be targeted by cyberspace operations. 
The wide range of case examples alone suggests that there is utility in this type 
of operation, but the degree to which these examples have succeeded has 
depended upon the degree to which these insurgencies have relied upon 
channels of communication vulnerable to cyberspace operations. Even in those 
cases, in none of these case examples do cyberspace operations drive a COIN 
effort, although in all of them cyberspace operations provide a valuable insight or 
advantage that could not be gained or replicated through other means. 
f. Mapping Cyberspace Attack to Unity of Command and Unity of 
Effort 
Cyberspace attack supports the unity of command and unity of effort for a 
COIN commander by providing cyberspace attack options through appropriate 
channels, and by liaising with strategic cyber command echelons to request 
customized cyber munitions that meet a commander’s OCO needs. Examples 
include pre-authorization to conduct specified cyberspace attacks if criteria are 
met either inside or outside of cyberspace. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance for the intersection of 
cyberspace attack and unity of command and unity of effort. JP 3–12(R) 
discusses the detailing of cyber teams to commanders in detail, including the 
channels through which authorization for attacks can be achieved. The 2013 
version of this publication reflects the current model at the time of its publication 
for balancing local needs and the strategic impact of using cyberspace munitions. 
The noticeable deficiency in guidance in JP 3–12(R) that prevents this thesis 
from classifying it as excellent is that it makes no mention of the ability of local 
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cyber teams to request cyberspace munitions from higher echelons. It focuses 
only on the authorization and planning support that higher echelons can provide. 
JP 3–24 focuses much more on the effects that cyberspace actions can achieve 
in support of a COIN than the manner in which cyberspace professionals seek 
approval to provide those effects. The publication does acknowledge the 
existence of this issue by stating that cyberspace professionals need to deconflict 
and coordinate with appropriate agencies, but provides few details on this 
process. This lack of detail is probably wise, as it does not drive a re-write of 
COIN guidance every time cyberspace assets and authorities are redefined. 
Examples of delegated permission to develop and launch different types 
of cyberspace munitions is not actively debated at this time, partially because so 
few sophisticated cyberspace munitions have been developed, launched, and 
claimed by nation states. This lack of many sophisticated cyberspace munitions 
is largely due to the cost of making them. The Stuxnet worm required “zero-day 
exploits, a Windows rootkit, the first ever PLC rootkit, antivirus evasion 
techniques, complex process injection and hooking code, network infection 
routines, peer-to-peer updates, and a command and control interface” (Falliere, 
Murchu, and Chien 2011, 1). Despite this development cost, though, some 
writers anticipate that “as technology advances, the high demand, low density of 
the precision cyberspace munitions will increase to the availability needed at the 
tactical battlefield (Myers 2011, 52).” 
These writers seem justified in their predictions, as the Department of 
Defense has recently begun shopping for cyber munitions development. Last 
year, U.S. Cyber Command released a draft plan to outsource many of its cyber 
support activities (Sternstein 2015). This draft plan included a Task Order 
Request for services, including a Cyber Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 
(JMEM) initiative, which would assist in the production and employment of 
cyberspace munitions (Federal Systems Integration and Management Center 
2015, C-26–C-27). Cyberspace professionals support a COIN commander’s unity 
of command and unity of effort by tapping into this growing body of cyber 
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munitions and offering unique cyber capabilities to accomplish the commander’s 
objectives. 
The degree to which the intersection of cyberspace attack and unity of 
command and unity of effort contributes to a COIN campaign increases as the 
projected length of an insurgency increases, but has not been seen as more than 
a moderate contribution. The resources that a COIN commander can request 
from higher echelons are tailored to specific threats and detailed technical 
characteristics of an insurgency’s cyber infrastructure. When a COIN commander 
anticipates that their campaign will extend for a significant period of time, they 
can request these tailored resources and achieve greater effects than their 
smaller, locally assigned cyber forces can achieve alone. 
C. SUMMARY 
The degree to which current doctrine addresses each cell in this matrix 
varies, but fit into one of four categories. Current doctrine provides excellent 
guidance on the effects listed in two of these cells, and how they relate to 
accomplishment of the COIN tenets. It provides sufficient guidance for four more 
cells, either fully exploring the effects listed with minimal connection to the COIN 
tenets, or only discussing a portion of these effects but relating them well to the 
COIN tenets. Current guidance is only minimal for nine of these cells, either 
because it does not address them directly or because it only lists a portion of the 
effects in a cell and does not connect them to COIN tenets. Current doctrine 
does not address nine of these cells at all. 
The contribution that the effects listed in these cells make towards 
accomplishment of the COIN tenets also varies. Ten of these cells describe 
effects that make a significant contribution to accomplishment of the tents, either 
complementing other efforts or making contributions that are unique to the cyber 
domain. Nine of these cells describe effects that make a moderate contribution, 
largely supporting other efforts or replicating the success of other efforts in the 
cyber domain. The remaining five cells either do not contain effects because they 
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do not have a logical application, or contribute nothing new or significant to 
accomplishment of the COIN tenets. 
The following table, Table 2, summarizes these findings, grouping 
together a few of these categories. Each cell has a color for current doctrinal 
guidance on top and significance of contribution to accomplishment of COIN 
tenets on bottom. If the guidance provided by current doctrine for a cell is 
excellent or sufficient then it is color-coded green, and if the guidance provided 
by current doctrine is minimal or non-existent then it is color-coded red. If the 
contribution of the effects listed in a cell is moderate at best, then it is color-
coded green, and if the contribution of the effects listed in a cell is significant then 
it is color-coded red. 
Table 2.   Doctrine Coverage and COIN Significance of Matrix Cells 
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The next chapter categorizes the cells of the matrix based on the 
relationship between the degree to which current doctrine addresses each cell 
and the degree of contribution each cell can make towards accomplishing the 
tenets of a COIN. It uses this categorization to prioritize the cells most needing 




IV. ASSESSMENT OF MATRIX AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this chapter, we discuss how the mapping exercise of the previous 
chapter reveals the degree to which current doctrine provides guidance on 
incorporating cyberspace operations into a COIN. We categorize the cells of the 
matrix based on how well current doctrine already addresses these cells, and 
how significantly these cells contribute to accomplishing COIN tenets. We 
analyze the cells in each category, and propose additions to doctrine, as 
appropriate. We then address the constraints of this mapping exercise and make 
recommendations for future research. Finally, we summarize the findings of the 
mapping exercise and the recommendations that stem from it. 
A. CELL CATEGORIZATION 
The order in which this thesis categorizes the cells of the matrix is by the 
priority with which they should be addressed to inform insufficiencies in current 
doctrine. Low priority cells are those for which current doctrine already provides 
excellent or sufficient guidance, regardless of the degree to which they contribute 
to accomplishment of the COIN tenets. Medium priority cells are those for which 
current doctrine provides minimal or no guidance, and whose contribution to 
accomplishment of the COIN tenets is moderate at best. High priority cells are 
those for which current doctrine provides minimal or no guidance, but whose 
contribution to accomplishment of the COIN tenets is great. As outlined earlier, 
the two cells that do not have a logical link between cyberspace effects and 
accomplishment of COIN tenets (the mappings of cyberspace defense and 
cyberspace attack to develop the COIN narrative) are omitted. 
1. LOW PRIORITY 
Seven cells fall into this category: the mappings of cyberspace OPE to 
synchronize and integrate LOEs; the mappings of cyberspace defense to 
primacy of politics, secure the population, and synchronize and integrate LOEs; 
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and the mappings of cyberspace attack to primacy of politics, secure the 
population, and unity of command and unity of effort. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace OPE to synchronize and integrate LOEs. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
JP 3-12(R) provides extensive guidance for cyber support elements (CSEs) on 
how to provide a supported commander with desired effects while also 
synchronizing their efforts. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace defense to primacy of politics. It describes the effects that 
cyberspace operations can achieve by stating that DCO will “protect freedom of 
maneuver for HN governance” (USJCS 2013b, VII-1). While this guidance 
appears to place the responsibility for all HN cyberspace defense in the hands of 
the COIN force, this lack of doctrinal guidance on strengthening HN government 
cyberspace security is addressed in the analysis of another cell. 
Current doctrine provides excellent guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace defense to secure the population. It lists the effects that can be 
achieved through defensive cyberspace operations and connects these effects to 
securing the population. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace defense to synchronize and integrate LOEs, but it does not provide 
guidance with regard to log analysis at higher echelons. Addressing this 
insufficiency is not a priority for three reasons. First, this type of operation would 
only apply in the case of a sophisticated and persistent attack against friendly 
forces, but this has not been seen in previous COIN campaigns. Second, JP 3-
12(R) may address this issue in future editions, as there is already a model for 
this relationship in the business world. Third, it is likely that higher echelons 
already analyze all attacks after an initial defense is mounted. Formalizing this 
component of Cyberspace Defense may orient cyberspace professionals towards 
log collection and storage for later use to a more significant degree, but this is 
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already a basic part of cyberspace defense according to cyber security standards 
that the US military follows. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance on the mappings of 
cyberspace attack to primacy of politics and secure the population, but it does 
not provide the type of examples or detailed guidance that it provides for other 
types of operations. Addressing this insufficiency is a low priority; however, we 
still recommend an addition to current doctrine. The specific targets of 
cyberspace attack change over time, but there are identifiable and common 
cyberspace resources used by many insurgencies. To address this insufficiency, 
doctrine should include targeting these insurgent cyberspace resources in its 
appendices of example methods and targets. 
Current doctrine provides sufficient guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace attack to unity of command and unity of effort, providing a model for 
incorporating all the effects that a local CSE provides for a COIN commander. 
The one form of guidance that current doctrine does not provide is the manner by 
which sophisticated cyber munitions or capabilities can be requested from higher 
echelons of cyber command to support a COIN campaign. Based on the 
projected increase in the number of these munitions being developed and utilized 
in the future, current doctrine should address the manner in which these 
munitions are requested and deployed. This thesis has discussed the pending 
development of a JMEM for these types of munitions, so this minor insufficiency 
in guidance is already being addressed elsewhere. 
2. MEDIUM PRIORITY 
Nine cells fall into this category: the mappings of cyberspace ISR to 
understand the OE, develop the COIN narrative, primacy of politics, synchronize 
and integrate LOEs, and unity of command and unity of effort; the mappings of 
cyberspace OPE to develop the COIN narrative and primacy of politics; the 
mapping of cyberspace defense to unity of command and unity of effort; and the 
mapping of cyberspace attack to synchronize and integrate LOEs. 
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Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace ISR 
to understand the OE, but addressing this insufficiency is not a priority for two 
reasons. First, the body of knowledge that is already recorded for each nation 
and that is provided for a commander executing a COIN campaign will collect 
much of this information. Second, if doctrine evolves to collect more cyber-unique 
characteristics of an OE as a part of intelligence analysis frameworks (addressed 
in more detail in the discussion of other cells), then it will already collect this 
cyber-specific information in that step of intelligence gathering and analysis. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace ISR 
to develop the COIN narrative, but addressing this insufficiency is not a priority. 
JP 3-24 highlights the importance of including cultural and historical references in 
the COIN narrative. Cyberspace professionals can analyze the most commonly 
referenced pages on local servers, and provide the most popular words, 
symbols, and cyber personas for inclusion in a COIN narrative. While this 
process can be done legally through the collection of only public information, this 
type of information collection may appear invasive, so is better left out of official 
publications, and adopted as a standard practice or published only in secure 
versions of cyberspace doctrine. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace ISR 
to primacy of politics, but addressing this insufficiency is not a priority. While 
some cyberspace assets are included in existing analysis frameworks like DIME, 
ASCOPE, or PMESII, these frameworks do not measure the capacity or 
resilience of a HN government’s cyber infrastructure. There are proposed 
methods of collecting and quantifying this information which doctrine can include, 
but this type of change needs to be made in intelligence doctrine on analysis 
frameworks, instead of cyber-specific or COIN-specific doctrine. This type of 
change also cannot be made until one of the many proposed metrics is adopted 
by the Department of Defense. 
Current doctrine provides incomplete guidance on the mapping of 
Cyberspace ISR to synchronize and integrate LOEs, and addressing this 
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insufficiency is a priority. The case example referenced in chapter three of 
Bosnian peacetime operations illustrates the hazards of not applying cyberspace 
resources to coordinate and evaluate the IO and PSYOPS operations conducted 
in a HN. To address this insufficiency, doctrine should include guidance on the 
ways in which cyberspace ISR collects data that can be used as quantifiable 
Measures of Effectiveness. 
Current doctrine provides minimal guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
ISR to unity of command and unity of effort, but addressing this insufficiency is 
not a priority. While current doctrine provides guidance on the intelligence that 
can be collected by CO to some degree, it does not address the intelligence that 
can be collected for CO. As stated earlier, the Air Force has already identified 
this interrelationship and is standing up a command to address it. While joint 
cyberspace doctrine should address this component of intelligence operations, 
only those COIN campaigns against an insurgency that is heavily reliant on 
cyberspace will reap significant benefit from aligning their intelligence collection 
efforts accordingly. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
OPE to develop the COIN narrative, but addressing this insufficiency is not a 
priority for four reasons. First, there is moderate benefit from using cyber-specific 
communication channels to transmit the COIN narrative, but this is only one 
additional venue of many that a HN population may use. Second, there is a risk 
that insurgents may subvert any social media accounts made by a host nation 
that does not safeguard its control of these accounts. Third, this guidance may 
not apply if a HN population does not use or value cyber-specific communication 
channels. Fourth, this guidance may soon become irrelevant, as most 
governments are standing up social media presences as a generally accepted 
aspect of governance in the modern era. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
OPE to primacy of politics, and addressing this insufficiency is a priority for two 
reasons. First, the wording of JP 3-24 currently gives the COIN commander 
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responsibility for defending all of friendly cyberspace. This large responsibility is 
one which a COIN commander can share with a HN government. Second, as 
discussed in chapter three of this work, the United States has already conducted 
similar exercises with partner nations in NATO that build all participating nations’ 
cyberspace defense. Strengthening the cyberspace defense of a HN government 
directly impacts the legitimacy of that government. To address this insufficiency, 
doctrine should include guidance on performing “White Hat” training exercises 
with the HN government. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
defense to unity of command and unity of effort, but addressing this insufficiency 
is not a priority. In instances where this coordination will occur, it will occur 
because private or outside, unaffiliated organizations request this coordination. 
Doctrine cannot account for all contingencies, and the specific nature of this type 
of coordination, while beneficial, is so unique to each COIN campaign that it is 
difficult to provide guidance that is specific enough to aid planners or 
commanders. 
Current doctrine provides minimal guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
attack to synchronize and integrate LOEs, but addressing this insufficiency is not 
a priority. Current doctrine already addresses the need to deconflict CO with 
other operations, and states that IGL is a major concern in this process. The 
expanded guidance that may be provided for this cell is that cyberspace attacks 
can complement other operations in unique ways. One example is that 
successful compromise of an e-mail server or other insurgent cyberspace 
communication platforms may yield intelligence gains with little or no impact on 
other operations except to gather intelligence without being detected. Another 
example is that when other intelligence operations are gathering intelligence over 
a particular communication channel, cyberspace operations can disrupt other 
channels in order to route more information through the channels where 
collection is easiest. While these operations may be conducted in cyberspace 
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with less risk of detection, these types of operations have equivalents in other 
domains, and there is no pressing need to publish new doctrine for CO. 
3. HIGH PRIORITY 
Six cells fall into this category: the mapping of cyberspace ISR to secure 
the population; the mappings of cyberspace OPE to understand the OE, secure 
the population, and synchronize and integrate LOEs; the mapping of cyberspace 
defense to understand the OE; and the mapping of cyberspace attack to 
understand the OE. 
Current doctrine provides limited guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
ISR to secure the population, and addressing this insufficiency is a priority. 
Current guidance limits the detection of enemy cyberspace actions and malware 
to those observed on friendly networks, which assumes that there will be no 
authority granted to interact with local, private actors for the purposes of 
collecting information. While the authority to conduct covert intelligence gathering 
on these networks is not guaranteed, there are many forms of overt intelligence 
collection that can be collected, which can reveal enemy cyberspace activity. 
One example is the probing of local DNS servers to determine if they are “open 
resolvers,” as mentioned in Chapter III. To address this insufficiency, doctrine 
should include guidance on identifying and prioritizing weaknesses in the HN’s 
privately owned or controlled but publically accessible cyber infrastructure. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
OPE to understand the OE, and addressing this insufficiency is a priority. 
Cyberspace professionals should enable local, private cyber actors to adopt 
international and/or NIST standards, as this can limit the ability of insurgents to 
exploit these actors’ cyberspace assets and can open new avenues of reporting 
between the local population and HN government or COIN force. To address this 
insufficiency, doctrine should include guidance on interaction with local, private 
cyberspace actors to encourage them to adopt cybersecurity standards, and to 
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maintain an open channel with these actors for reporting anomalous activity or 
possible cyberspace attacks. 
Current doctrine provides incomplete guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace OPE to secure the population, and addressing this insufficiency is a 
priority. Multiple case examples have shown that individual members of an 
insurgency can be targeted directly if the channels over which these members 
communicate are identified and used to transmit appropriate IO messages. 
Current doctrine only addresses communication channels with respect to 
insurgent organizations as a whole. To address this insufficiency, doctrine should 
include guidance on enabling COIN and HN government forces to directly 
communicate with members of an insurgency. 
Current doctrine provides minimal guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
OPE to unity of command and unity of effort, but addressing this insufficiency is 
not a priority at this time. The SECDEF recently published guidance to address 
this insufficiency, and the next generation of cyberspace doctrine will likely 
incorporate this guidance. Because this guidance was published in classified 
arenas, this thesis is unable to speculate as to whether the new SECDEF 
guidance will address this insufficiency. Any proposed change or addition to 
future cyberspace operations or COIN guidance may be irrelevant or redundant 
as a result of this guidance, so it would not be a prudent area in which to 
recommend a change or addition to current doctrine. 
Current doctrine provides incomplete guidance on the mapping of 
cyberspace defense to understand the OE, and addressing this insufficiency is a 
priority. Current doctrine does not provide guidance on the defense of private 
cyberspace actors within a HN in any meaningful way. There are both direct and 
indirect benefits of supporting the defense of private and civilian infrastructure. 
The direct benefits are that insurgents will be less able to exploit local targets and 
that local businesses will view the COIN effort favorably if it prevents them from 
losing money. The indirect benefits are that local businesses will be brought into 
the global market to a greater degree and that the economic opportunity provided 
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by stable, legal businesses would reduce the number of disenfranchised 
members of the HN population who may turn to an insurgency for support. To 
address this insufficiency, doctrine should include guidance on working with 
local, private cyberspace stakeholders to build their cybersecurity capacity, and 
to help them recover from cyberspace attacks. 
Current doctrine provides no guidance on the mapping of cyberspace 
attack to understand the OE, and addressing this insufficiency is a priority. 
Throughout the preceding decades, there have been multiple joint publications 
written on the placement and use of a wide range of sensors. As discussed in 
Chapter III, IARPA is already contracting for the development of cyberspace 
sensors, so these types of sensors are likely going to be a facet of military 
operations and planning if they are not already. Despite this trend, the 
consolidated and summarized sensor guidance in appendix B of JP 2-0, Joint 
Intelligence, which provides detailed guidance on the sensors and collection 
methods used to gather imagery and signals intelligence (USJCS 2013, B-1-B-4), 
provides no guidance on the use of sensors within cyberspace. To address this 
insufficiency, current doctrine should provide guidance on the placement and use 
of cyberspace sensors. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The mapping exercise conducted here identifies two cells where current 
doctrine is sufficient but can benefit from additional guidance, and seven cells 
where current doctrine is insufficient and additions to existing doctrine can 
address these insufficiencies. The total recommended addition to doctrine is a 
few sentences to the assessment and cyber considerations sections of JP 3-24, 
a few lines and an additional sub-section to the appendices of JP 3-24, an 
additional sub-section to an appendix in JP 2-0. 
The insufficiencies revealed by analyzing the mappings of cyberspace 
attack to primacy of politics and secure the population are not a high priority, but 
they can both be addressed in appendix D of JP 3-24. This appendix provides 
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examples of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for a wide array of 
supporting operations, but does not address cyberspace operations. 
Insurgencies often use social media pages to attack government resources and 
discredit the HN government legitimacy. Insurgencies also often depend on 
common cyberspace resources to organize and seek outside assistance, like 
websites and bank accounts. We recommend adding this basic, three-item list of 
sample targets to this appendix D. Doing so will provide examples of cyberspace 
operations that contribute to accomplishment of the COIN tenets. 
The insufficiency revealed by analyzing the mapping of cyberspace ISR to 
synchronize and integrate LOEs is a medium priority, and can be addressed in 
the assessment section of chapter four in JP 3-24. This section is titled 
“Assessment Complexities in COIN” (USCJS 2013b, IV-3-IV-4), and it identifies 
the complexities of developing MOEs and MOPs in a COIN environment. The 
discussion that follows does not prescribe methods for overcoming these 
challenges, except for one example related to the training of HN security forces 
(USCJS 2013b, IV-7). Our work has discussed ways in which cyberspace ISR 
can provide quantifiable MOEs. We recommend adding another assessment 
example or a modification of the provided assessment example in chapter four, 
to demonstrate the way in which cyberspace operations provide a unique answer 
to a significant synchronization and integration challenge which COINs face. 
The insufficiency revealed by analyzing the mapping of cyberspace OPE 
to primacy of politics is a medium priority, and can be addressed in appendix D of 
JP 3-24. Appendix B of that document addresses the training and equipping of 
police and HN government military forces as well as counter-drug operations, but 
it does not address cyberspace defense training or equipping. The United States 
has already performed DCO training exercises with its NATO allies, as discussed 
in Chapter III, which is a cyber domain equivalent in strengthening the 
cyberspace defense capability of all participating nations. We recommend adding 
a cyberspace defense training section to appendix B of JP 3-24, to provide 
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guidance on cyberspace training operations that strengthen and legitimize the 
HN government. 
The insufficiency revealed by analyzing the mappings of cyberspace ISR 
to secure the population and cyberspace OPE, and defense to understand the 
OE, are high priority, and all three can be addressed in chapter seven of JP 3-24. 
Current doctrine provides little to no guidance on assessment of or interaction 
with private, local cyberspace actors. Case examples in Estonia and Poland 
demonstrate the benefit of working with local businesses, ISPs, and universities 
to identify and address cybersecurity vulnerabilities outside of the DODIN or HN 
government cyberspace. JP 3-24 contains a section on community stability 
operations that describes similar operations conducted by partnered COIN and 
HN government forces in the land domain (USJCS 2013b, V-15). This thesis 
recommends adding a sentence or two to the “Building HN Cyberspace 
Capability” (CJCS 2013, VII-2) section of chapter seven. The language used to 
describe equivalent operations in the community stability section can be 
repurposed to provide guidance on cyberspace community stability operations 
that contribute significantly to accomplishment of multiple COIN tenets. 
The insufficiency revealed by analyzing the mapping of cyberspace OPE 
to secure the population is a high priority, and can be addressed in chapter 
seven of JP 3-24. Current doctrine provides no guidance on the use of 
cyberspace operations to enable COIN and HN actors to directly communicate 
with members of an insurgency. The case examples from Aceh, India, and 
Malaysia referenced in Chapter III all demonstrate the success that this form of 
direct communication can achieve. We recommend adding a sentence or two to 
the main paragraph of the cyberspace considerations section of JP 3-24, to 
provide guidance on cyberspace operations that create unique effects that 
contribute to securing the population. 
The insufficiency revealed by analyzing the mapping of cyberspace attack 
to understand the OE is a high priority, and can be addressed in appendix B of 
JP 2-0. Current doctrine does not provide guidance on the placement or use of 
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sensors in the cyber domain. Appendix B of JP 2-0 provides guidance on the 
type of information collected and the types of intelligence products that result 
from the use of many different types of sensors, but does not use the word 
“cyber,” and only uses the word “Internet” to describe open-source intelligence 
collection. The IARPA “CAUSE” initiative discussed in Chapter III and similar 
programs designed by DARPA (Keromytis, 2012) indicate that the government 
will soon be awarding contracts for the development of cyberspace sensors, if it 
is not doing so already. If it is the case that sensor acquisition is preceding more 
rapidly than sensor doctrine in the cyber domain, then this insufficiency in 
guidance is one that impacts not just COIN campaigns, but many other types of 
military conflicts as well. This thesis recommends adding a cyberspace sensor 
section to Appendix B of JP 2-0, to provide guidance on cyberspace operations 
that contribute unique intelligence gathering to the effort to understand the OE. 
C. CONSTRAINTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are three qualifications that must be addressed to place this 
mapping exercise in an appropriate context. First, this mapping exercise relies on 
unclassified information as its only sources of both doctrinal guidance and case 
examples. Second, this mapping exercise also relies exclusively on the 
definitions provided by joint doctrine to describe the terminology it uses. Finally, 
this mapping exercise does not address the process of gaining authority to 
conduct any of these cyberspace operations. Each of these constraints shapes 
the results of this exercise, and therefore the conclusions of this thesis. 
The use of only unclassified information presents a limited or possibly 
even distorted viewpoint of the state of cyberspace operations and 
counterinsurgency operations. Classified information may provide different 
answers to two of the three questions that this thesis explores in each cell. First, 
any classified guidance that the DOD provides its service members for the 
conduct of cyberspace operations is absent from this work. Cyberspace 
operations are strongly connected to information and intelligence operations, and 
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they rely upon emerging technology. Both of these factors make cyberspace 
operations the type of operations that governments do not fully discuss in 
unclassified environments. Second, unclassified sources do not include case 
studies that may be available in classified sources. Such case studies may alter 
the perceived degree to which the effects described in these cells have been 
seen in real world COINs. Future research can evaluate whether the conclusions 
of this thesis are altered when classified guidance and case examples are 
included. 
The use of definitions from joint doctrine further limits the viewpoint from 
which this mapping exercise is conducted. Even within the DOD, the cyber-
specific terminology used here is defined in doctrine, but not agreed upon in a 
practical sense. One example is the placement of sensors. This thesis classifies 
this type of operation as a cyberspace attack because an emplaced sensor 
manipulates some portion of cyberspace to send information to a collection point 
so that intelligence collected can deny insurgents the ability to conduct some 
activity in the physical domain, qualifying as a “manipulation that leads to denial 
that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains” (USJCS 2013b, II-5). 
The case example used was the observation that Boko Haram’s use of cyber-
specific resources provides intelligence that “could be used to detect and defeat 
or prevent terrorist threats or attacks” (Ajike 2015, 32). Many cyberspace 
professionals would not sensor placement or reconfiguration as a cyberspace 
attack but as an intelligence action. This thesis does not address or provide 
recommendations for this constraint other than to restrict itself consistently to the 
definitions used in joint doctrine. 
The process of gaining authorities to conduct cyberspace operations is not 
addressed by this thesis for two reasons. First, the link between the needs of a 
commander and the OCO/DCO/DODIN split is not direct, as it is shaped by the 
requirement to gain legal authority. Providing freedom of maneuver alone 
requires a range of operations that span both DODIN operations and DCO 
(Williams 2014, 16). Second, the use of effects-based planning does not prevent 
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the process of intent-based requests for authority—it only informs it. Accordingly, 
the DOD may not be able to authorize some of these cyberspace operations, 
even if they have been seen in other nations’ COIN efforts. A useful extension of 
this thesis would be research into the issue of authorities along two different 
lines. The first would examine the degree to which the process of gaining 
authority to conduct cyberspace operations would be complicated or simplified if 
requests stemmed from the effects-based division of CO instead of the currently 
used intent-based division. The second would examine operations provided by 
the effects-based division of CO that are not authorized by existing authorization 
framework, to determine whether this is because the authorization framework is 
flawed and not authorizing legal operations, or if the effects-based division of CO 
provides flawed guidance for operations that are illegal. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This work examines the doctrinal guidance provided by the Department  
of Defense in its unclassified Joint Publications on Cyberspace Operations  
and Counterinsurgency Operations. The specific focus of this examination  
is an analysis of the relationship between the cyberspace actions listed in JP 3-
12(R) and the COIN tenets listed in JP 3-24. We find that there are multiple 
insufficiencies in current doctrine for the application of cyberspace operations  
in support of COIN campaigns. Many of these insufficiencies are likely related  
to the lack of maturity in the doctrine on cyberspace operations generally, as  
JP 3-24 provides guidance for other domains that is lacking for operations in the 
cyber domain. A few of the insufficiencies are likely due to a lack of realization of 
the full extent of cyberspace capabilities and their potential application to COIN 
operations. This is likely due to the fact that cyber-unique capabilities have only 
appeared with real-world case examples in recent years. The remaining 
insufficiencies reflect that doctrinal guidance regarding cyberspace operations is 
trailing behind technological innovation and legal precedent. 
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While the work presented here must be qualified by its use of unclassified 
source material, debatable terminology, and assumed authorities, it presents a 
critique of current doctrine and recommendations for doctrine improvement that 
can be openly debated and incorporated by a wide audience. Most of the 
recommendations are simply to add equivalent or additional guidance for 
operations within the cyber domain, and none of the recommendations cites a 
failure in current doctrine. This alone yields a key conclusion: current doctrine 
does not provide incorrect or harmful guidance; it merely has yet to fully  
account for the emerging role of cyberspace operations in COIN operations. The 
matrix developed in this work identifies specific areas in which current doctrine 
can be strengthened, and the accompanying analysis generates specific 
recommendations to help guide policy development toward that objective. 
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APPENDIX A. CYBERSPACE ACTIONS 
The following is an excerpt from JP 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations. It is 
the full text of the Cyberspace Actions section that is summarized in Chapter III 
of this thesis. 
Chapter II: Cyberspace Operations 
Section 2: Military Operations In and Through Cyberspace 
e. Cyberspace Actions. While the JFC’s military missions in cyberspace 
(OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations) are categorized by intent, as described 
above, these missions will require the employment of various capabilities to 
create specific effects in cyberspace. To plan for, authorize, and assess these 
actions, it is important the JFC and staff understand how they are distinguished 
from one another.  
(1) Cyberspace Defense. Actions normally created within DOD 
cyberspace for securing, operating, and defending the DODIN. Specific actions 
include protect, detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate. Such defensive 
actions are usually created by the JFC or Service that owns or operates the 
network, except in such cases where these defensive actions would impact the 
operations of networks outside the responsibility of the respective JFC or 
Service.  
(2) Cyberspace ISR. An intelligence action conducted by the JFC 
authorized by an EXORD or conducted by attached SIGNT units under 
temporary delegated SIGINT operational tasking authority. Cyberspace ISR 
includes ISR activities in cyberspace conducted to gather intelligence that may 
be required to support future operations, including OCO or DCO. These activities 
synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of cyberspace systems, in 
direct support of current and future operations. Cyberspace ISR focuses on 
tactical and operational intelligence and on mapping adversary cyberspace to 
support military planning. Cyberspace ISR requires appropriate deconfliction, and 
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cyberspace forces that are trained and certified to a common standard with the 
IC. ISR in cyberspace is conducted pursuant to military authorities and must be 
coordinated and deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies.  
(3) Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment. OPE 
consists of the non-intelligence enabling activities conducted to plan and prepare 
for potential follow-on military operations. OPE requires cyberspace forces 
trained to a standard that prevents compromise of related IC operations. OPE in 
cyberspace is conducted pursuant to military authorities and must be coordinated 
and deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies.  
(4) Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace actions that create various direct 
denial effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) and 
manipulation that leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical 
domains. These specific actions are:  
(a) Deny. To degrade, disrupt, or destroy access to, operation of, or 
availability of a target by a specified level for a specified time. Denial prevents 
adversary use of resources.  
1. Degrade. To deny access (a function of amount) to, or operation of, a 
target to a level represented as a percentage of capacity. Level of degradation 
must be specified. If a specific time is required, it can be specified.  
2. Disrupt. To completely but temporarily deny (a function of time) access 
to, or operation of, a target for a period of time. A desired start and stop time are 
normally specified. Disruption can be considered a special case of degradation 
where the degradation level selected is 100 percent.  
3. Destroy. To permanently, completely, and irreparably deny (time and 
amount are both maximized) access to, or operation of, a target.  
(b) Manipulate. To control or change the adversary’s information, 
information systems, and/or networks in a manner that supports the 
commander’s objectives.   
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APPENDIX B. TENETS OF COIN 
The following is an excerpt from JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. 
It is the full text of the COIN Tenets section that is summarized in Chapter III of 
this thesis. 
Chapter III: Fundamentals of Counterinsurgency 
Section 3: Tenets of Counterinsurgency  
The operational tenets of COIN are to provide guideposts for the joint 
force. These tenets complement the principles of joint operations and provide 
focus on how to successfully conduct COIN. The tenets of COIN are further 
supported by the tactical precepts of COIN.  
For additional information on the principles of joint operations, see Joint 
Publication (JP) 3–0, Joint Operations, and for information on the precepts of 
COIN, see Appendix D, “Precepts for Counterinsurgency.” 
a. Understand the OE. Because each COIN operation is different, 
significant time and resources are devoted at the outset to develop a robust 
understanding of the nature of the conflict, the insurgency, and a holistic 
understanding of the OE where the COIN effort will take place (see Chapter IV, 
“The Operational Environment,” for an explanation of understanding the OE in 
COIN). It is through this understanding that the JFC can decipher the true nature 
of the problem the joint force operation is meant to resolve; develop realistic end 
states and intermediate goals; identify an operational approach that is relevant to 
the nature of the conflict, and appropriate for the local context of the operational 
area, and determine feasible operations based on available resources; consider 
relevant aspects of the OE during the planning of lethal and nonlethal missions 
and activities for increased chances of success; and determine potential second- 
and third-order effects. By clearly understanding the nature of the challenge, the 
COIN force can align forces, capabilities, missions, and goals. All members of 
the COIN force work to develop and maintain a common understanding of key 
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aspects of the conflict and the OE. This common understanding helps drive 
coordination and synchronization of the efforts of all COIN partners during the 
planning and execution of operations. COIN operations are dynamic, and the 
situation within the OE can change rapidly, requiring the joint force to constantly 
monitor, evaluate, and assess the nature of the conflict and the operationally 
relevant aspects of the OE.  
(1) Sociocultural Knowledge. Sociocultural knowledge is essential to 
successful COIN. American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not 
universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different 
notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, political 
organization, social order, and norms concerning gender. What may appear 
abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal 
to an HN group member, and vice versa. U.S. counterinsurgents—especially 
commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders—should strive to avoid imposing 
their ideal of normalcy on a foreign culture. On the other hand, U.S. personnel 
should keep in mind that cultural norms and traditions are often linked to political 
agendas and ideologies, may vary considerably across the HN society, and may 
be heavily contested. In some cases, disputes over cultural traditions may be an 
element of the root causes of the insurgency, or part of the narrative insurgents 
craft to mobilize support. Service forces should receive appropriate cultural 
awareness training before joining specific COIN operations.  
(2) Understanding HN Partners. While improving the capacity of the HN 
government to control its territory and population is key, addressing the core 
grievances is also necessary to end the insurgency. External counterinsurgents 
will often have to cajole or coerce HN governments and entrenched elites to 
recognize the legitimacy of those grievances and address them. Reforms that 
threaten the political and financial interests of those elites are most likely to 
generate resistance. Therefore, external counterinsurgents have to put as much 
effort into understanding and shaping the behavior of their HN partners as they 
do into countering the insurgents. This typically requires a critical assessment of 
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the motivations and interests of factions and individuals within the HN 
government. See Chapter IV, “The Operational Environment,” for more detail.  
(3) Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment. Insurgencies are protracted by 
nature, and history demonstrates that they often last for years or even decades. 
Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of time and resources, 
especially if they must be conducted simultaneously with operations in a 
protracted war combining traditional and irregular warfare (IW). The relevant 
population may prefer the HN government to the insurgents; however, people do 
not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the 
counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win—credibility. 
The insurgents’ primary battle is against the HN government, not the U.S.; 
however, U.S. support can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s 
viability. The population must have confidence in the staying power of both the 
U.S. counterinsurgents and the HN government. Insurgents and the relevant 
population often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the U.S. 
to abandon a COIN effort. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by 
deeds, can overcome that perception and bolster U.S. credibility. Even the 
strongest U.S. commitment, however, will not succeed if the population does not 
perceive the HN government as having similar credibility. U.S. forces must help 
create crucial HN capabilities and capacities to sustain the HN’s credibility and 
legitimacy. It is also important to note that U.S. support to an HN’s COIN efforts 
can decrease or even cease while the HN’s COIN efforts are still fighting an 
insurgency. This normally is because the HN can successfully deal with the 
insurgency.  
(4) Preparation. Preparing for a protracted COIN effort requires 
establishing headquarters and support structures designed for long-term 
operations. Planning and commitments should be based on sustainable 
operating tempo and personnel tempo limits for the various components of the 
force. Even in situations where the U.S. goal is reducing its military force levels 
as quickly as possible, some support for HN institutions usually remains for a 
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long time. U.S. preparatory actions for long-term support must come at the public 
request of the HN and be focused on supporting the IDAD strategy.  
(5) U.S. Public Support. U.S. public opinion should be considered as part 
of the OE, just as the indigenous population opinion is essential to the COIN 
effort, because USG COIN efforts must prove worthwhile to the U.S. public. At 
the national strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a 
protracted deployment is critical. Demonstrating incremental success is essential 
to maintaining support.  
(6) Learn and Adapt. Counterinsurgents may develop situational 
awareness of the OE as the COIN operation is executed. Counterinsurgents 
assess and adjust the operation’s design and plan throughout the operations.  
b. Develop the COIN Narrative. Fulfilling military objectives is only part of 
the COIN effort: the key is to demonstrate to the relevant actors that the HN 
government and its allies are not only winning, but that their cause is just and 
irresistible. This is accomplished through the development of a COIN narrative to 
directly compete with the insurgent narrative. The COIN narrative should 
contextualize what the population experiences, legitimizing counterinsurgent 
actions and delegitimizing the insurgency. It is an interpretive lens designed to 
help individuals and groups make decisions in the face of uncertainty where the 
stakes are perceived as life and death. The COIN narrative should explain the 
current situation and describe how the HN government will defeat the insurgency. 
It should invoke relevant cultural and historical references to both justify the 
actions of counterinsurgents and make the case that the government will win.  
(1) The COIN narrative provides an operational framework for integrating 
IO with the full range of lethal and nonlethal military and civilian operations in 
order to shape the perception of relevant actors, particularly the insurgents and 
the population. The COIN narrative operationalizes the concept of “propaganda 
of the deed,” which recognizes that actions have significance beyond their direct 
or immediate consequences. Actions signal an actor’s intentions and indicate its 
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credibility to follow through on promises and threats; they constitute a critical 
form of communication to local audiences. Every action takes on a symbolic 
meaning that is interpreted through the lens of the narrative. Simply assuming 
that relevant actors will interpret counterinsurgent actions the way they were 
intended leaves them vulnerable to misinterpretation or deliberate distortion by 
insurgents. Conversely, intentional exploitation of this phenomenon can magnify 
the impact of counterinsurgent actions on the population and the insurgency.  
(2) The COIN narrative should be based on the counterinsurgents’ 
politico-military strategy and be developed in conjunction with the military 
operational approach. At the tactical level, the COIN narrative should help units 
and any civilian partners interpret operational-level guidance and select the most 
appropriate tools and methods to address specific local-level COIN challenges. 
Choosing approaches that are both effective at solving the immediate challenge 
and consistent with COIN narrative helps ensure that tactical successes amount 
to more than the sum of their parts, shaping the perceptions of insurgents and 
population and achieving operational objectives over time.  
(3) U.S. forces committed to supporting COIN are there to assist an HN 
government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself, 
which is also normally the goal even if the U.S. begins COIN in an area that does 
not have an HN government. Regardless of the starting conditions, the HN 
ultimately has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable 
local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and USG departments and agencies 
can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory. 
While it may be easier for joint forces to conduct operations themselves, it is 
better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. HN 
governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually 
all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers; the sooner the main effort 
can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.  
(4) Manage Expectations. The U.S. and its HN partners must take steps to 
proactively manage the expectations of the local population and other relevant 
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actors. This process involves encouraging and reinforcing reasonable 
expectations, setting counterinsurgents up for success when they prove able to 
deliver on promises. Counterinsurgents trying to build enthusiasm for their efforts 
should avoid making unrealistic promises. At best, a failure to deliver promised 
results may undermine the credibility of the counterinsurgents, and at worst be 
interpreted as deliberate deception rather than good intentions gone awry. 
Conversely, consistently meeting reasonable expectations can increase the 
population’s patience with the inevitable inconveniences and uneven progress 
typical in COIN operations.  
c. Primacy of Politics. At the beginning of a COIN operation, military 
actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure 
the populace and kill or capture insurgents. However, USG and HN political 
objectives guide the COIN approach. Commanders must consider how 
operations contribute to strengthening the HN government’s legitimacy and 
achieving U.S. goals—the latter is especially important if the HN is very weak, 
whether failing or recovering. This means that political and diplomatic leaders 
must actively participate through all aspects (planning, preparation, execution, 
and assessment) of a COIN effort. The political and military aspects of 
insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable: military action is 
valuable only where it supports the political strategy. Resolving most 
insurgencies requires a political solution, whether or not facilitated by significant 
military activities. Moreover, most insurgency solutions involve some sort of 
political compromise and are rarely a “winner take all” situation. In COIN, the 
relationship between military operations and achieving political objectives is more 
complicated than in traditional warfare. Traditional adversaries invest in building 
conventional military capabilities that are distinct from the population and take 
significant time and effort to regenerate if destroyed. In contrast, the low resource 
requirements of insurgent groups allow them to generate military strength directly 
through mobilization of segments of the population. If the root causes of the 
insurgency—the opportunity, motive, and means factors—are left unaddressed 
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or are exacerbated by combat operations, insurgent forces often prove able to 
regenerate or even expand their political appeal and military strength. 
Consequently, counterinsurgent military operations must be carefully designed to 
support the political strategy at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
COIN often requires a mixture of aggressive lethal operations to degrade 
insurgent capabilities and disrupt insurgent networks, and nonlethal operations to 
begin addressing core grievances. However, both lethal and nonlethal efforts 
should be guided primarily by their potential to influence the perceptions of the 
insurgents and the population. In COIN, both the objectives and the way they are 
achieved affect the perceptions of the population: actions executed without 
properly assessing their political effects at best result in reduced effectiveness 
and at worst are counterproductive. Therefore, political considerations inform all 
aspects of operational art, including the prioritization and sequencing of 
operations, the employment of forces, and guidance regarding tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTP). Avoid excessive collateral damage and 
disproportionate use of force. The COIN force needs to avoid collective 
punishment of the population within the contested area and escalating 
repression. Forces that engage in coercion and intimidation are placed at an 
operational disadvantage. As the OE changes so must the operational approach.  
d. Secure the Population. The most important concern for the population 
caught in the midst of a COIN is security. The centrality of the population to 
success in COIN makes population security the foundation for all other efforts 
and a prerequisite for lasting stability. Civilians tend to cooperate with whichever 
side proves capable of providing a predictable and tolerable environment. 
Although the conditions that constitute predictable and tolerable vary across 
different contexts and societies—and may vary within the operational area—they 
boil down to a clear set of rules that are consistently enforced under which the 
population feels it can reasonably survive. In many cases, civilians will cooperate 
with the side that establishes effective control over their area even if it contradicts 
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their political preferences. However, understanding and addressing the 
population’s security concerns can prove challenging.  
(1) Human Security and Prioritization. To effectively secure the population, 
the concept of security has to be expanded beyond the suppression of insurgent 
activity and protection from physical violence to include the full range of issues 
that affect individual and community survival. While physical security is the first 
priority, other critical factors can include access to dispute resolution, the 
protection of human rights, access to critical community resources (migration 
routes, grazing land), and access to essential services. The expectations and 
priorities of the population define which factors are relevant and what constitutes 
acceptable conditions, not Western standards or assumptions. Those 
expectations may vary enormously across different parts of the operational area 
or the population (urban versus rural areas; mining communities versus nomads). 
Providing human security should be integral to efforts to expand HN control at 
the local level. In some areas, the sequencing is reversed: addressing other 
aspects of human security—such as rule of law and security of livelihoods—may 
be a prerequisite to establishing a security presence capable of defending the 
population from insurgent violence.  
(2) Physical Security. Insurgent violence against the population shapes 
the populations behavior in three key ways. It undermines the government’s 
credibility and legitimacy as a provider of security in return for cooperation; it 
isolates the population from the government by punishing those seen to be 
collaborating; and it establishes a rival system of control/governance over the 
civilian population. If insurgents are able to establish a more credible and 
consistently enforced set of rules than the government, the population is more 
likely to cooperate irrespective of whether they agree with the insurgents’ goals. 
Since insurgents require secrecy, anonymity can be stripped from key persons of 
interest via the application of biometrics and biometrics-enabled intelligence. 
Thus it is critical that the COIN force provide adequate levels of security for the 
population in order to retain its support and cooperation. Those efforts should 
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align with the overall politico-military strategy, but to be effective they must 
address the full range of security concerns of the population, which may extend 
well beyond the insurgents and not be captured in standard military threat 
assessments. Particularly where the HN government or security forces have a 
history of human rights violations, or insurgent violence has effectively 
intimidated the populace into silence, COIN forces may have to make a 
concerted effort to understand how the population perceives the security 
environment.  
(a) COIN forces may be a source of insecurity for the population as well. 
There is balance to be struck between two competing objectives: being as close 
as feasible to the population to bring security, and ensuring that such proximity 
does not have the unintended effect of endangering the population by placing a 
military objective in their midst. Abusive, corrupt, or predatory behavior by 
elements of the security forces can taint the entire COIN operation, undermine 
the legitimacy of the HN government, and push the population to support the 
insurgency. This is particularly true if the population interprets such abuses as 
evidence of a broader struggle for survival between different identity groups. 
Even one or two incidents, if captured in video or as still images, can undermine 
the entire COIN strategic narrative. In such cases, abuses have the potential to 
inflame a security dilemma and play into the insurgent narrative.  
(b) Law Enforcement Use of Force. The perception of legitimacy with 
respect to the use of force is also important. If the HN police have a reasonable 
reputation for competence and impartiality, it is better for them to execute urban 
raids, as the population is likely to view that application of force as more 
legitimate than military action. This is true even if the police are not as well armed 
or as capable as military units. However, local circumstances affect this decision. 
If the police are seen as part of an ethnic or sectarian group oppressing the 
general population, their use may be counterproductive. Effective 
counterinsurgents thus understand the character of the local police and popular 
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perceptions of both police and military units. This understanding helps ensure 
that the application of force is appropriate and reinforces the rule of law.  
 (3) Rule of Law. Access to effective mechanisms to resolve disputes 
without resorting to violence and in accordance with a consistent set of rules is 
fundamental to ensure that the population feels secure. The rule of law should 
govern the conduct of COIN forces, transparently and consistently following its 
own rules to demonstrate the political credibility of the HN government and its 
allies to the population and the insurgents.  
(4) As with governance systems in general, the legal systems deemed 
most effective and legitimate in the eyes of the local population may differ greatly 
from Western models, and may vary across the operational area (e.g., the capital 
city versus remote rural areas). JFCs should endeavor to support locally 
appropriate systems while adhering to U.S. and international human rights 
standards.  
(5) Even carefully targeted military operations against insurgents can 
create risks for the population. The security of the population may require 
offensive operations against insurgents to seize the initiative and neutralize the 
threat. In some contexts, populations have proven tolerant of increased civilian 
casualties as a result of aggressive offensive operations against insurgents when 
those operations helped produce a significant overall improvement in civil 
security. In other contexts, every civilian casualty resulting from COIN operations 
has undermined support for the government and its allies. COIN forces should 
carefully assess the political, cultural, and security context through the eyes of 
the population in order to develop an effective approach to managing this 
dilemma. Normally, counterinsurgents can use rules of engagement (ROE) to 
minimize potential loss of life. ROE should address lesser means of force and 
nonlethal means when such use is likely to create the desired effects, and joint 
forces can do so without endangering themselves, others, or mission 
accomplishment. Escalation of force procedures do not limit the right to use 
deadly force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile actor 
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demonstrating hostile intent. Commanders should provide training on the rules 
for the use of force and ROE. Even precise and tailored force must be executed 
legitimately and with consideration for consequent effects. Overwhelming effort 
may prove necessary to destroy an opponent, especially extremist insurgent 
combatants. However, counterinsurgents should carefully calculate the type and 
amount of force and who applies it, regardless of the means of applying force. An 
operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads 
to the recruitment of 50 more insurgents. Thus, careful targeting is required to 
weigh the potential effects and perceptions of the relevant population, the U.S. 
population, the multinational partner populations, and international opinion.  
(6) Isolate the Insurgency. Insurgents must be isolated from the 
population, their cause, and support. While it may be required to kill or capture 
insurgents, it is more effective in the long run to separate an insurgency from the 
population and its resources, thus letting it die. Confrontational military action, in 
exclusion, is counterproductive in most cases; it risks generating popular 
resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of 
revenge.  
(a) Expropriating the Insurgent Cause. Skillful counterinsurgents can deal 
a significant blow to an insurgency by expropriating its cause. Insurgents often 
exploit multiple causes, however, making counterinsurgents’ challenges more 
difficult. In the end, any successful COIN operation must address the legitimate 
grievances insurgents exploit to generate popular support. These may be 
different in each local area, in which case a complex set of solutions will be 
needed. A mix of usurpation and direct refutation may also be used. 
Counterinsurgents may champion portions of the insurgents’ cause while directly 
refuting others. This approach may be especially useful when stated insurgent 
goals are clearly disproportionally beneficial to one group. Counterinsurgents 
may be able to also “capture” an insurgency’s cause and exploit it. For example, 
an insurgent ideology based on an extremist interpretation of a holy text can be 
countered by appealing to a moderate interpretation of the same text. When a 
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credible religious or other respected leader passes this kind of message, the 
counteraction is even more effective.  
(b) Cutting Logistics. Counterinsurgents must cut off the flow of arms and 
ammunition into the area and eliminate their sources. An effective weapon in 
denying logistics to an insurgency is populace and resource control. These two 
controls are distinct, yet linked, normally a responsibility of indigenous civil 
governments. They are defined and enforced during times of civil or military 
emergency.  
1. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human 
resources, denies personnel to the enemy, and detects and reduces the 
effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, 
movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and relocation of the 
population.  
2. Resource control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel 
resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. 
Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, 
checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and 
inspection of facilities.  
(c) Reducing Finances. Counterinsurgents can exploit insurgent financial 
weaknesses. Controls and regulations that limit the movement and exchange of 
materiel and funds may compound insurgent financial vulnerabilities. These 
counters are especially effective when an insurgency receives funding from 
outside the state. Additionally, effective law enforcement can be detrimental to an 
insurgency that uses criminal means for funding. Department of the Treasury 
designations and other diplomatic tools outside the scope of DOD are key to 
countering threat finance. The JFC must work closely with the COM to identify 
and target counter threat finance (CTF) sources, and may even consider the 
creation of interagency and threat finance cell (TFC) to enhance the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to support and strengthen U.S., 
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multinational, and HN efforts to disrupt and eliminate key insurgent financial 
network nodes.  
(d) Momentum. 
As the HN government increases its legitimacy, the populace begins to 
assist it more actively. Eventually, the people marginalize and stigmatize 
insurgents to the point that the insurgency’s claim to legitimacy is destroyed. 
However, victory is gained not when this isolation is achieved, but when 
legitimate government functions are maintained by and with the people’s active 
support and when insurgent forces lose legitimacy.  
e. Synchronize and Integrate Lines of Effort (LOEs). 
In COIN, lethal and nonlethal activities cannot be designed and 
implemented in isolation. They are carefully synchronized at the operational and 
tactical levels to reinforce each other and support the COIN narrative. From 
planning through execution, the efforts of joint interagency, multinational, and HN 
participants are integrated toward a common purpose. Insurgent opportunities, 
motives, and means typically cut across the spectrum of LOEs, so that failure to 
integrate will at best render the COIN effort less effective and at worst lead to 
counterproductive impacts across different LOEs. Counterinsurgents will 
therefore have to prioritize efforts while remaining cognizant of the linkages and 
effects these operations will have in other areas.  
f. Unity of Command and Unity of Effort  
(1) Unity of Command. Military unity of command is the preferred method 
for achieving unity of effort in any military operation. Military unity of command is 
achieved by establishing and maintaining formal command or support 
relationships. Unity of command should extend to all military forces engaged in 
COIN (U.S., HN, and other multinational forces). The purpose of command 
relationships is for military forces, police, and other security forces to establish 
effective control while attaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
within the society.  
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(2) Unity of Effort. Many participants in a COIN effort may not be subject to 
unity of command, so unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN 
operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can conflict or 
provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Usually, JFCs work to achieve 
unified action through liaison and interorganizational coordination with the 
leaders of a wide variety of government and multinational agencies, including 
those of the HN and the U.S. Whether there is a single chain of command or not, 
there must be a single mission, which is COIN. The military contribution to COIN 
is coordinated with the activities of USG interagency partners, the operations of 
multinational forces, and activities of various HN agencies (to the extent they are 
all participants in the COIN operation) to be successful. Nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) activities cannot and will not be integrated with military plans. 
For further details on U.S. military and NGO relations, see Guidelines for 
Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian 
Organizations in Hostile and Potentially Hostile Environments. It is not helpful to 
assign military actors with a security mission and civilian actors with a 
governance and development mission.  
(3) Coordination with NGOs. Governmental participants in COIN will likely 
need to coordinate with NGO actors as well. Most NGOs will not allow their 
activities to be integrated with military plans in order for NGOs to maintain 
impartiality and independence in their operations, acceptance for their role 
among the conflict-affected population, and the ability to operate securely.  
(4) Intelligence Drives Operations. Effective COIN is enabled by timely 
and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and disseminated 
throughout the force. A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence 
that contribute to the conduct of subsequent operations. Reporting by units, 
members of the country team, and information derived from interactions with 
civilian agencies is often of equal or greater importance than reporting by 
specialized intelligence assets. This reporting may be both solicited and 
unsolicited information from the relevant population or insurgency defectors. In all 
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cases corroboration of the information retains significant importance to prevent 
acting upon false, misleading, or circular reporting. These factors, along with the 
need to generate a favorable operational tempo, drive the requirement to 
produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical level. The perishable 
nature of some intelligence requires commanders to establish organizational 
architectures that provide operations-intelligence fusion at the lowest possible 
tactical level. Also, units should deploy analytical capacity as far forward as 
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